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Sommaire 
 
Les usines récupérées par les ouvriers en Argentine sont devenues un mouvement 
social emblématique symbolisant l'un des aspects de la révolte sociale entourant la crise 
économique de 2001-2002. Les usines récupérées sont des entreprises abandonnées par leurs 
propriétaires originaux ou déclarées faillite, laissant derrières elles des salaires et des dettes 
impayés. Par conséquence, les ouvriers ont commencé à récupérer leurs usines; reprenant la 
production sans leurs anciens patrons, sous, et au profit de la gestion collective des ouvriers. 
Le mouvement est remarquable pour sa rémunération égalitaire et sa gestion horizontale. 
 
Ce travail examine la continuité des usines récupérées et ceci à travers l'évolution 
sociale, politique et économique du paysage de l'Argentine. Il évalue également l'impact du 
mouvement en tant que défi aux modes économiques de production hégémoniques et orientés 
vers le marché.  En supposant que l'avenir du mouvement dépend de deux ensembles de 
facteurs, le rapport analyse les facteurs internes à travers le prisme de la théorie de 
mobilisation des ressources, ainsi que les facteurs externes à travers la perspective de la 
théorie de la structure de l'opportunité politique. 
 
Le travail conclut que la situation actuelle se trouve dans une impasse dans laquelle le 
mouvement a gagné l'acceptation institutionnelle, mais a échoué d'effectuer le changement 
structurel favorisant ses pratiques et garantissant la sécurité à long terme. Il argumente que le 
mouvement doit consolider certains aspects combatifs. Il doit consolider sa nouvelle identité 
en tant que mouvement social et forger des alliances stratégiques et tactiques tout en 
préservant son autonomie. 
 
 
Mots-clés: mouvements sociaux, politique de l’Argentine, usines récupérées, autogestion, 
« horizontalism », crise Argentine de 2001-2002.  
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Abstract 
 
The worker-recovered factories of Argentina became an emblematic social movement 
symbolizing one of the aspects of the social upheaval surrounding the economic crisis of 
2001-2002. The recovered factories are enterprises abandoned by their original owners or 
declared bankrupt, leaving behind unpaid wages and trailing debts. In response, workers 
began recuperating their factories; resuming production without their former bosses, under, 
and for the benefit of, a collective worker management. The movement is remarkable for its 
egalitarian remuneration and its horizontal management.  
 
This paper examines the continuity of the recovered factories through the evolving 
social, political and economic landscape of Argentina. It also assesses the impact of the 
movement as a challenge to the hegemonic, market-oriented, economic modes of production. 
Assuming that the future of the movement depends on two sets of factors, the paper analyses 
internal factors through the prism of resource mobilization theory and external factors from 
the perspective of political opportunity structure theory. 
 
The work concludes that the current situation is one of stalemate, in which the 
movement gained institutional acceptance, but failed to effect structural change favouring its 
practices and guaranteeing long-term security. It argues that the movement needs to 
consolidate certain combative aspects. It must consolidate its new identity as a social 
movement and forge strategic and tactical alliances while preserving its autonomy. 
 
 
 
Keywords: social movements, Argentine politics, worker-recovered factories/enterprises, 
workers’ self-management, “horizontalism”, Argentine crisis of 2001-2002. 
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Introduction 
 
Argentina’s worker-recovered factories have attracted much attention to 
the country’s experience with self-management. Recovered factories are 
enterprises that were abandoned by their capitalist owners in the wake of the 2001 
economic crisis that hit Argentina, and later put back into production by the 
workers under the principle of self-management. An estimated 2500 firms were 
shut down between 2001 and 2002 (Petras 2003a); the number of factories 
subsequently taken over by the employees varies according to source, ranging 
from 150 (Ballvé 2006) to 200 (Zibechi 2004). However, the significance of the 
movement eclipses the number of factories and workers involved in the process to 
reach a symbolic dimension. The idea of worker control and the demonstrated 
capacity of workers to reactivate production without bosses or capital “creates the 
possibility of redefining capital-labour relations and questioning the unconditional 
supremacy of property rights” (Palomino 2003).   
The aim in this essay is to come up with answers to the question of 
whether the recovered factories movement in Argentina constitutes a serious 
threat to the prevailing capitalist structures of control over workers, and, beyond 
that, to trace the potentials and limitations of the movement continuity within the 
dynamic circumstances of Argentina.  
This introduction presents a broad definition of the topic, placing the  
choice of the subject in the foreground. It describes the relevance of the 
contribution, and then elaborates the methodology and structures of the study. The 
introduction provides an overview of the basic concepts and theories that guided 
the research and of the body of literature that sustained the study.    
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The symbolic and practical significance of a nascent movement 
The impact of the recovered factories movement might surpass Argentina. 
Already the experience has become a source of inspiration worldwide. A movie 
by Naomi Klein and Avi Lewis called “The Take”1 has brought the movement to 
the attention of various progressive circles; the movie’s popularity was not only 
due to Klein’s reputation as an activist and academic, but also to the appeal of the 
‘utopian’ idea of worker self-management. Various cinematographic figures like 
the Argentinian filmmaker Fernando (Pino) Solanas have examined the 
experience2, and a score of articles, papers and books have been written about it. 
In October 2005, a Latin American gathering of worker-recovered factories was 
organized in Caracas, in an attempt to build a cross-continental movement. Along 
with Venezuelan, Brazilian, and Uruguayan workers, Argentinian workers were 
heavily present and had played an important role in the organization of the event 
(Martin 2005). 
The idea of worker control over the means of production is a centre-piece 
of the socialist project, dating to its early beginnings. Worker self-management 
“stands in contrast to the bureaucratic centralism of the former Soviet Union and 
the hierarchical system of capitalist management” (Petras & Veltmeyer 2002). 
Building an alternative social project from below that is capable of re-defining 
capital-labour relations has become an urgent challenge for leftist movements 
since the fall of the Soviet Union and the ascendency of the neoliberal model. One 
way to achieve this goal is building alternatives to the dominant model based on 
                                                 
1
 Lewis, A. & Klein, N., The Take: Occupy, Resist, Produce, Ottawa/Toronto: National Film 
Board of Canada, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Klein Lewis Productions (2004). 
2
 Solanas, F., La Dignité du Peuple, Argentine-Brésil-Suisse: Production Cinesur SA (2005). 
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egalitarian principles, and worker self-management is a concrete aspect of this 
egalitarianism.  
Worker self-management is a core constituent of direct democracy, which 
is about building open spaces where citizens can freely debate, express 
themselves, and vote on issues of concern without intermediaries. When applied 
to the workplace or any other unit, the result of such a system of governance is an 
increase of the individual’s role in the process, and a decrease in the ability of 
professionals and representatives to manoeuvre (Mothé 2006, 56-65). Direct 
democracy in the form of worker self-management is thus a way to empower the 
working class, which has been historically subjected to the will and directives of 
bosses and to the elite of professionals and managers they serve. 
Mothé traces two historical lines within the proponents of self-
management: revolutionary and alternative.  
The revolutionary believes that self-management is incompatible with the 
capitalist system; they see the overthrow of capitalism as a necessary 
precondition. According to the revolutionaries, when the state abolishes private 
property, it lays the groundwork for self-management and it then becomes 
possible to establish worker control and direct democracy assemblies, the latter 
preventing the state from transforming into an authoritarian bureaucracy. Self-
management is usually associated with a revolutionary context, in which actors 
are passionately animated by a desire for radical change (Mothé 2006). The 
historical successes of such experiences have been rare and limited in duration.  
The alternatives, on the other hand, try to advance the notion of self-
management by multiplying concrete examples of direct democracy in time and 
space. The idea here is to propagate direct democracy and self-management little 
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by little; both by proving that the model is viable and by demonstrating its ethical 
and practical superiority over existing alternatives. According to Mothé, over the 
past 50 years, the fieldwork and ideas of the proponents of self-management have 
gained in credibility and are becoming increasingly accepted. This is far from the 
radical change of the revolutionary dream, but nevertheless represents a slow, 
steady progress. 
In this regard, the Argentinian experience with self-management offers 
promising hope to those aspiring to attain social change. It can become an 
irrefutable proof of workers’ capacity to take matters into their own hands and to 
create a democratic space in their workplace. The success of this experience 
creates the potential for a qualitative change in the workers’ role in production.  
The experience derives further importance from Argentina’s particular 
position at the time of the crisis:  an exemplary pupil of the IMF and the World 
Bank in the 1990s, it was considered a laboratory of neoliberal policies. In this 
sense, the Argentinian crisis of 2001 was different from the crises that struck 
Brazil, Asia and Russia in the previous decade. While the latter occurred in state-
led, export-oriented economies, Argentina had adopted neoliberal economics and 
implemented a severe Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) (Teubal 2004).  
The economic crisis of 2001 was the worse crisis in Argentinian history; it 
plunged the country into chaos and witnessed a popular uprising and the 
emergence (and resurgence) of various social movements, one of which was the 
worker-recovered factories movement. For many, the crisis projected the failure 
of neoliberalism and signalled the ascendance of alternatives and resistance 
movements challenging the neoliberal doctrine. This is seen as part of a general 
movement of contestation sweeping Latin America (Vanden 2003). Social 
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movements represent an integral part of this movement of contestation that is 
questioning the foundations of neoliberal politics and trying to propose an 
alternative path. The worker-recovered factories movement in particular is an 
important sign of this symbolic contestation movement. 
Parallel to the discourse of globalization and the pressures to open up 
markets and to implement structural adjustment policies, a globally coordinated 
response has been articulated. Antonio Negri’s work - although contested by some 
within the movement, like Petras (Petras 2003b, 1-16) - gained enormous 
influence and is considered to be the manifesto of the alter-globalization 
movement (Negri & Hardt 2001).  
Since the threats posed by neoliberalism are global and affect everyone, 
opposition should include the widest possible range of alliances. The alter-
globalization movement was thus organized under the popular banner of ‘another 
world is possible’. Grasping every available opportunity, the movement has 
sought to demonstrate that opposition to global injustice is also global. A sense of 
a transnational unifying movement exists within the opposition to neoliberal 
globalization. This movement has adopted the task of creating an alternative path. 
Some call the set of alternative experiences that defy neoliberalism, proposing a 
more just and egalitarian model, ‘globalization from below’ (Starr 2000, 83-110). 
The movement of recovered factories belongs to this tradition.  
The experience of worker self-management is not novel to the world in 
general, nor to Latin America in particular. Worker self-management was the 
official doctrine of the Yugoslav socialist regime from the 1950’s until the break-
up of the Yugoslav state. Algeria and Israel had their well-known experiences. A 
number of countries in the Latin American continent like Chile, Peru and Bolivia 
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experimented with worker self-management, with little success, for short periods 
in various instances and under different conditions. The lessons drawn from these 
experiences can serve to guide Argentinian workers trying to build an alternative 
model on their own, without effective tools and resources (Petras 2002).  
For their part, the recovered enterprises face formidable challenges, 
including: running a factory or an enterprise under financial strain without capital 
or credit; putting a plant into production after it has been deserted by managers 
and professionals; preparing non-specialist workers to assume managerial and 
financial tasks (previously performed by specialized professionals); learning to 
build a movement to fight for their daily bread while concurrently defending the 
right to expropriate factories; and learning how to build alliances within the 
broader political context while avoiding the traps of petty politics. Drawing 
lessons from these previous experiences and transmitting them to new 
experiments can give a practical meaning to the study of social movements. 
The introduction has, up to now, presented the context in which the 
movement formed and outlined its significance. These elements brought the 
movement to the attention of the author in the first place. Now the work turns to 
the task of elaborating the analytical framework that guides the rest of this study. 
 
Explanatory conjectures of the birth and continuity of the movement 
Various factors have played a role in facilitating the movement of factory 
recoveries in Argentina. Many theories seem useful in explaining the emergence 
of this movement.  
According to Hirschman, for example, a potential contending group is 
affected negatively by its members’ capacity to exit.  What is meant by ‘exit’ here 
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is the ability to defect from the group or to be recruited by an alternative 
(Hirschman 1970). Whenever alternatives to the needs or services benefiting the 
group’s members exist, the opportunity to exit the group becomes a threat to its 
ability to transform into an effective movement.  
In the context of Argentina’s economic crisis, the future appeared bleak for 
workers in the bankrupt factories. The unprecedented rates of unemployment 
meant the absence of alternatives or exit possibilities. The factory closures meant 
loss of jobs and unemployment was the quasi-certain outcome. Under such 
conditions, the workers had no choice but to take up the fight in order to get their 
jobs back and prevent an imminent catastrophe.  
“If we hadn’t had our backs against the wall, we wouldn’t be here right 
now,” as Gustavo Crisaldo, a machinist and member of the management 
committee in the worker-recovered factory of Cristal Avellenda, put it (Ballvé 
2006).    
The recovered factories of Argentina benefited from a rare opportunity in 
the political history of the country. As noted by various experts who study social 
movements, the degree of openness and vulnerability displayed by the political 
system can be instrumental in defining the outcome of a movement of 
contestation. When the political structure is fragile, the contending group is more 
likely to benefit from the situation because the opposing party is willing to give 
concessions to avoid additional threats. This was the case of Argentina post-2001. 
The crisis was of unprecedented scale and it severely affected the political 
structure. It took several weeks for the country to regain a minimum of political 
stability. During this period, five consecutive presidents resigned and the slogan 
‘que se vayan todos’ (let them all leave) was the order of the day.  
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In this situation, the political elite needed to re-establish order and avoid 
further confrontation. However, if the ‘structure of political opportunities’ at a 
specific conjuncture allowed the factories to be taken over and lent 
manoeuvrability to the movement, the movement’s continuity and future success 
need to be examined differently.  
This study is mainly interested in the question of the movement’s 
continuity. The future of a movement is related to two major factors that are 
consistently treated in the literature on social movements. One is internal and the 
other relates to the political environment and surrounding circumstances. In order 
to sketch the potential outcome of the recovered factories movement, one must 
examine both factors. Accordingly, in this study, two levels will be examined: the 
internal dynamics of the movement; and the interaction of the political structure 
with the movement.  
The movement of recovered factories is not homogeneous. There are 
several organizational groupings within the movement. Each of these has a 
different dynamic; the course of each and the nature of the relations between them 
affect the internal dynamics of the movement. Internal dynamics shape the 
movement’s identity and define its goals and strategy.  
At the same time, the relative permissiveness of the political system that 
benefited the recovered factories and other social movements in Argentina is a 
dynamic factor. To some extent, the future of the recovered factories depends on 
the direction in which the political situation evolves. The degree of strength and 
stability of the political structure will affect the relation between the state and the 
movement of recovered factories.  
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Oberschall (Oberschall 1973, 102-145) provides a theoretical framework 
that enables us to evaluate the internal dynamics of the movement and the 
prospects awaiting it. Oberschall classifies social movements into six groups 
according to two sets of variables. One set of variables is related to the nature of 
the ties that bind members of the group together; categorized as communal, un-or-
weakly-organized, and associational. A second set of variables refers to the 
relations the group has with other elements of society; here we have two 
categories, the integrated and the segmented.  
 
Vertical dimension: 
links between                 
collectivities 
Horizontal dimension : links within the collectivity 
Communal          Un-or                       Associational 
Organization      weakly-organized  Organization 
Integrated 
Segmented 
A B C 
D E F 
 
Figure I: Oberschall’s Classification of Collectivities (Oberschall 1973, 120) 
 
Each of the variables and the six categories will be explained in detail in 
Chapter Two (Figure I elaborates this classification). The task of this paper will be 
to categorise the worker-recovered factories movement in accordance with 
Oberschall’s scheme, to assess its potential to move from one category to another 
within the scheme, and thus try to predict the best strategy for its survival. 
Beyond the image of spontaneous uprisings often associated with social 
movements, it takes a concerted effort on the part of a movement’s initiators to 
construct an effective social movement. Tilly remarks that the scale, durability 
and effectiveness of a movement of contestation rely heavily on what he calls 
“political entrepreneurs”; professional political organizers capable of foreseeing 
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the importance of mounting “campaigns, social movement performances and 
WUNC [Worthiness, Unity, Numbers and Commitment] displays” (Tilly 2004, 
13). This is another organizational element that will be interesting to examine in 
complement with Oberschall’s scheme.  
Two additional aspects of the movement might prove crucial to its survival 
and capacity to evolve: the nature of its organization and its ability to forge 
alliances and ‘to bridge’ other social groups. Gamson has noted in his extensive 
research on social movements in the United States that groups characterized by a 
centralized or bureaucratic organization are more successful in achieving their 
goals (Gamson 1990). Likewise, strategic choices can prove essential to an 
aspiring social movement. The ability to bridge; that is, to emphasize issues 
converging with other movements, can be another vital aspect of survival and 
growth (Snow & Benford 1992). 
Kritschelt offers a different typology, one that is more relevant to testing a 
political system’s responsiveness to contestation (Kritschelt 1986, 57-85). This 
typology allows the study of the political structures from both the angle of what 
Kritschelt calls ‘input’, referring to the system’s receptiveness, and of ‘output’, 
meaning its capacity to implement policy. The current political situation in 
Argentina, the changes that were introduced in the first term of Nestor Kirchner’s 
presidency and potential scenarios for the country’s near future will be examined 
through this lens.  
Kritschelt subscribes to what is known as the “political opportunity 
structure” approach. Another relevant contribution to this approach comes from 
Tarrow. Following the inherent assumption of this school that contention is 
affected by factors external to the movement, Tarrow theorizes that it is 
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‘opportunities for’ versus ‘constraints upon’ collective action that defines the 
outcome of social movements. Furthermore,  
When institutional access opens, rifts appear within elites, allies become 
available, and state capacity for repression declines, challengers find 
opportunities to advance their claims. When combined with high levels of 
perceived costs for inaction, opportunities produce episodes of 
contentious politics. (Tarrow 1998, 71).  
 
The circumstances surrounding Argentina’s movement of recovered 
factories closely resemble what is described in this analysis. But the analysis goes 
further: since opportunities are ‘external’ they are volatile, and the structure of 
opportunities shifts. Being unstable, they are prone to decline, and such a down-
turn might lead to an unfortunate end to social movements (Tarrow 1998, 89).   
 
 Documentation and methodical sources for further analysis  
This study relies primarily on secondary sources which are based on visits 
to, and examinations of the experiences of, worker-recovered factories in 
Argentina. In addition to accounts from journalists and experts who are following 
or studying the movement, several books and papers have dealt with the subject. 
Unfortunately, due to a linguistic obstacle, this study will rely on sources 
available in French or English, omitting a number of Spanish-only references.  
However, a fair amount of literature on the subject has either been produced in, or 
translated into, French or English, providing substantial documentation.  
Analysis constitutes a considerable part of this study. This thesis is mostly 
interested in the movement’s potential and, specifically, its capacity to mount a 
viable and successful challenge to current social structures. Determining the 
degree of success requires an evaluation of the movement’s continuity, since the 
former depends to a large extent on the latter. The literature that boards the 
subject of the continuity of social movements, their outcomes and viability is 
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broad; only a few sources were cited in the previous section. Altogether, they 
constitute a precious arsenal for this study.   
Chapter One provides a survey of the recovered factories in Argentina. 
Drawing on existing sources, the story of the recovered factories, the 
circumstances leading to the emergence of this movement, along with the most 
recent developments, are reconstructed. In this part, the development of the 
movement, the patterns of factory occupations, the peculiarities of the movement, 
its nature and relations to other actors, are traced. This is accomplished by 
integrating available accounts. Because the experience is fresh and has attracted 
much attention, a body of existing narratives allowed crucial information to be 
double-checked. Because some accounts are highly enthusiastic about the 
experience and tend to exaggerate certain aspects of the phenomenon, narrative 
information had to be rigorously examined and suspicious aspects omitted. 
Whenever possible, facts were cross-referenced to two or more distinct sources.  
Having sketched a comprehensive representation of the movement, the 
paper will then turn to the relevant body of theoretical analysis; mainly, theories 
of the concept of ‘costs and benefits’, as elaborated by authors like Oberschall and 
Tilly, and of ‘opportunity structures’, as elaborated by authors like Kritschelt and 
Tarrow.  
The rest of the study is dedicated to an analysis based on the resource 
mobilization (RM) and political opportunity structure (POS) approaches. The 
framing assumption is that social movements are affected by two principal 
factors: the first being structural and mainly related to the nature of the 
movement; the second external and determined by the permeability of the political 
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system. These two theories will serve to evaluate the experience of the recovered 
factories, assessing downfalls, high points, and relevance.  
Chapter Two is dedicated to the internal dynamics of the movement. It 
attempts to dissect the strengths and weaknesses of the movement from the 
perspective of resource mobilization (RM) theories, an approach developed to 
study social movements. 
Chapter Three looks at the effects of political developments on the 
movement’s trajectory. It focuses on the nature of the political system, its 
responsiveness to social pressures, and the external factors that might facilitate or 
otherwise complicate the progress of the recovered enterprises. This chapter is 
approached mainly from the perspective of political opportunity structures (POS) 
theories.  
The Conclusion summarizes the main findings, highlights the major 
factors which will affect the movement’s continuity and indicates possible 
outcomes in order to open avenues for future studies.  
 
Below is a list of the types of sources used in the study: 
Primary sources 
• The study does not rely on primary sources; no original data has 
been produced by the author.  
Secondary sources 
• Journalistic and periodical articles: these are accounts or 
investigative pieces of journalism that describe the experience of 
recovered factories of Argentina, cover an aspect of the movement, 
or, in some cases, cover a relevant parallel or related experience. 
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They are of a short length that varies between two and eight pages. 
Most of them are available in electronic form. They provide 
descriptions of the phenomena, specific cases, and personal 
experiences. They yield key dates, places, numbers and other data 
on the factories (their names, particular histories and struggles).  
• Pamphlets and militant literature: unorthodox material produced by 
activists or collectives that endorse a cause. They address the topics 
of the Argentinian movement, labour issues and self-management. 
A limited number of such documents are used. Some are of an 
intermediate length (around 50 pages) while others are closer to 
book-length. Their specific value lies in their ability to depict 
workers’ struggles and aspirations; they tend to be utopian in their 
approach they are useful in constructing a portrait of the 
movement.     
• Electronic sources: what is only available online. Websites of 
specific organizations or factories. 
• Academic and specialized publications: material produced in the 
context of academic research or a specialized publication. These 
publications have a double value: adding analytic content to 
empirical research, and documentation. They offer a trustworthy 
source of information. The standardized scientific nature of these 
sources means that they can be built upon as part of the analysis for 
this study. These sources vary in length between 15 and 30 pages. 
• Monographs: extensive professional writing touching one of four 
questions: a- the Argentinian context; b- recovered factories; c- 
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alter-globalization and the culture of anti-authoritarianism; and d- 
social movements. On the basis of this body of literature, the 
research will be deepened, hypotheses formulated and analysis 
conducted. About thirty books are deemed essential to this case 
study.  
This contribution is aimed at overcoming the transience that characterises 
most of the literature on the subject. It draws on the theoretical literature about 
social movements in order to produce an assessment of more lasting value than 
the immediate and charged nature of existing literature. The continuity of the 
movement has been a relatively neglected question. Even the more academic and 
methodical bodies of work that have been produced, such as the works of 
Almeyra (2006), Fajn (2003), Ranis (2005) and Petras (2003a; 2007), seem to 
oscillate with the temporal situation. These assessments of outcomes look 
backwards rather than towards the future. This study is aimed at analyzing the 
elements that will affect the continuity of the movement in the future and the 
importance of its outcomes.  
The following chapter sets out a background for analysis by establishing 
an understanding of the movement’s development and the shifting social and 
political circumstances that encompassed its evolution and shaped surrounding 
events.  
 
 
 
 
 
Asserting worker-recovered enterprises 
Beyond a primitive response to crisis 
 
The transformations in Argentina at the beginning of this century aroused 
much debate. While some saw an accidental crisis, others talked of nothing less 
than revolution. The social movements that erupted in unanticipated fashion 
garnered lots of interest and lead to different interpretations. In order to analyse 
the phenomenon, it is necessary to dissect the circumstances that lead to the 
appearance of the recovered enterprises movement. Based on the existing 
literature, this chapter will provide a history of the movement and examine its 
nature, its relations to various internal actors and its implications. At the same 
time, it will cast a critical regard on the various approaches to the subject. 
 
From the Cordobazo to the Argentinazo 
In 2001, Argentina came near to revolution; the country’s economy was 
crumbling and people took to the streets to demand the departure of the political 
class. United under the slogan ‘Que se vayan todos’, the middle class joined the 
urban poor, the unemployed and the workers (Chesnais 2002, 56-63) in what 
became known as the argentinazo.   
This kind of popular revolt was not completely novel to the history of 
Argentinian social struggle. The name argentinazo echoes the term cordobazo, the 
latter referring to an early encounter between the Argentinian working class and 
policies favouring foreign capital and the interests of multinationals (represented 
at the time by the automobile industry) over the interests of wide sectors of 
Argentinian society. The cordobazo bears the name of the city of Cordoba, which 
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was the scene of a confrontation between workers and the forces of order on May 
29th, 1969. Confrontations between police and workers took place after workers 
declared a general strike in the automobile and metallurgical sectors, leading to an 
intervention by the military3 and sparking a worker- and student-led protest 
movement that assumed an insurrectional character (Chesnais 2002, 91-96).  
Argentina has a history of workers’ struggle, rooted syndicalism and mass 
movement protest. The radical syndicalism, as represented by the well-reputed 
anarchist union the FORA (Argentinian Regional Workers’ Federation), dates 
back to the end of the nineteenth century (Yerril 1987). Later on, strong unions 
like the CGT (General Confederation of Labour) emerged, which played a major 
role on the political scene. The Argentinian masses have taken to the streets at 
various moments of the country’s history. On June 20th, 1973, for example, an 
estimated three and a half million gathered in Ezeiza to welcome the legendary 
Juan Peron, paving the way for his return to power. 
  
The Corralito 
This rich history of struggle, that characterises the country’s past, was 
brutally suppressed by the dictatorship that had Argentina in its grip between 1976 
and 1983. The ‘dirty war’ waged by the military dictatorship against the 
progressive elements of society had a lasting effect; it took many years before 
society regained the power of contestation and overcame the fear that was one of 
the legacies of the military regime. The piquetero movement4 (movement of the 
unemployed) that emerged in the mid-1990s signaled a resurgence of active 
                                                 
3
 At the time Argentina was under the militarist rule of Juan Carlos Onganía. 
4
 A piquetero is someone who participates in piquete (‘picket’ in English) which designates road 
blockades, a tactic widely employed by the movement. 
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militancy. Nevertheless, the popular revolt of December 19th and 20th, 2001 took 
place in a context different from the pre-dictatorship era. 
With military rule came a set of policies aimed at liberalising the country’s 
economy; political measures known as the proceso which led to the flexibilization 
of financial operations. This was the beginning of an era of economic 
indebtedness (Teubal 2004).  
This policy of economic liberalisation was later pursued by the civilian 
governments that succeeded the junta in the 1980’s and 90’s. During the 
presidency of Carlos Menem (1989-1999), Argentina became an exemplary 
disciple of the World Bank. Menem introduced the ‘convertibility policy’, fixing 
the value of the peso on par with the US dollar. The Menem years witnessed the 
country’s adhesion to a fully fledged program of structural adjustments policies as 
recommended by the World Bank (Teubal 2004). The results of these policies 
were catastrophic. By 1998, the economy was in crisis: deprived of its productive 
sectors as a result of systematic de-industrialization – a direct consequence of 
economic liberalisation – and burdened by debt, the country had no means of 
paying its debt accumulations. From 2001 to 2002, Argentina recorded a negative 
growth of 15% (Petras 2003a), and the once exemplary student of the IMF 
defaulted on most of its $141 billion debt and devalued its currency (Blustein 
2003).  
In this situation, the Minister of the Economy, Domingo Cavallo, decided 
to drastically limit bank withdrawals by freezing cash extractions in US dollars 
and restricting withdrawals in pesos to 200 per week. These measures became 
known pejoratively as the corralito (Chesnais 2002, 40-41). At this stage, the 
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impasse became obvious to everybody; seemingly spontaneously5, people took to 
the streets, defying a curfew declared by the authorities. Crowds started to 
converge on the Casa Rosada, the architectural landmark of Buenos Aires that 
faces the famous Plaza de Mayo. Protesters filled the Plaza and the neighbouring 
streets, banging pots and asking the political elite to leave; the slogan ‘que se 
vayan todos’ became the unifying cry of the Argentinian people (Raimbeau 2006, 
20-21; Chesnais 2002, 45-50). The economy was paralysed and, while people 
were trying to return to their normal life, banks and foreign creditors were 
panicking, in fear of losing their investments. 
Armony rejects Chesnais’s ‘exaggerated’ portrayal of the events as a 
heroic revolutionary moment; he sees in them a new form of collective action 
(Armony 2005, 14). What was new about the mobilizations was the identity of the 
protagonists as ‘ordinary people’, the nature of their acts of civil disobedience, 
their determination to withdraw all trust from political actors and to reclaim their 
role as ‘citizens’ and, consequently, as exclusive policy-makers, and their 
disregard for institutions and authority (Armony 2005, 132). In fact, it is the view 
of this study that what happened in Argentina was, in a sense, a re-conquest of the 
public sphere; an assertion of the citizens’ role and a rupture with the political 
class.  
Nevertheless, the Argentinian mobilizations and subsequent diverse 
grassroots activities cannot be reduced to the rejection and de-legitimization of the 
political class. This is the mistake made by Quatrocchi-Woisson, who herself 
                                                 
5
 What is meant by spontaneity is the non-concerted nature of the initial popular reaction. 
Spontaneity refers to the unanticipated eruption of the movement that was catalyzed during the 
economic crisis. This use in no way denies the process of movement construction and 
consolidation nor is it meant to imply that social movements can erupt sporadically in any socio-
economic or political conjuncture. 
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recognizes that the historical approach, of which she is part, overlooks potential 
societal changes6 (Quatrocchi-Woisson 2003, 14).  
In the literature on post-2001 Argentina, this gap is not unique. Although 
Armony speaks of new forms of collective action, he fails to mention the 
movement of recovered factories which is such a striking example of these new 
forms of collective action; as Ruggeri (2006) calls it, a “social innovation”. In the 
context of a ‘political legitimacy crisis’, it is hard to understand how the 
Argentinian people could have ‘matured’ overnight, deciding to use their electoral 
rights to radically re-shape their situation while in fact ballots can rarely, if ever, 
bring about radical change. It is equally difficult to understand how the election of 
Néstor Krichner in May 2003 could mark the triumph of democracy and a new 
political era, especially when the traditional parties, including that of President 
Krichner, appear to remain.7  Ironically, in spite of the triumphalism that 
accompanied the 2003 presidential elections, the movement of recovered factories 
remains one of the brilliant facets of the 2001 “rebellion”. What follows is a close 
look at the phenomenon.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 If reduced to a question of political upheaval, the movement loses much of its significance as a 
genuine and spontaneous response that is part of a global resistance to neoliberalism. As we shall 
see, the protagonists were not interested in constructing political alternatives; rather, they were 
constructing alternative networks of ‘trade’, new social spheres and creative tactics of resistance.    
7
 Until June 2009, an alliance of diverse Peronist parties lead by Kirchner’s Frente para la 
Victoria (FPV) maintained an absolute majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies 
(the 2009 elections is discussed in the closing section). Major opposition parties included the 
historic Unión Cívica Radical, the coalition Alternativa por una República de Iguales and the new 
right wing coalition of Maurici Macri and Ricardo López Murphy, Propuesta Republicana. The 
traditional radical left continued to be marginal. 
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Workplaces lost, workplaces recovered 
In the bleak circumstances that brought Argentina to the verge of full-
fledged rebellion, businessmen and entrepreneurs frequently resorted to unlawful 
strategies to maximize profits, abandoning the workers and depriving them of 
their source of income. To those at the top of the social echelon, the fate of the 
workers didn’t seem to count for much; what counted was safeguarding capital so 
that it could be re-invested in new opportunities to generate wealth. These 
strategies included manoeuvres such as creating new debts or increasing existing 
ones, hiding goods and inventory, and eliminating machinery (Fajn 2003). In their 
quest for a safe exit from the crisis, the owners frequently disregarded the 
possibility of seeking solutions through sincere dialogue with the workers, even 
when the workers seemed prepared to sacrifice their scarce income to save their 
workplaces8. Indeed, in most cases, the crisis severely affected the employees, 
who endured cuts in salaries, lay offs and other measures taken at their expense. 
The precarity of their situation was accentuated by the extent of the economic 
strain on the country. 
In 1997, Argentinians had enjoyed the highest average salary in Latin 
America, close to $9000 per year; by 2002, it had dropped to $3200. Hundreds of 
thousands of workers lost their jobs in successive waves in a country that offered 
no social benefits (Guthmann & Tournon 2006, 8). Unemployment reached 30% 
in 2001, while 10,109 enterprises went bankrupt (Raimbeau 2006, 114). It was in 
this climate of uncertainty that the idea of factory occupation emerged as a 
defensive tactic. At first, workers occupied their workplaces in response to  
owners’ decisions to shut down the businesses. They demanded only to regain 
                                                 
8
 A report by the Buenos Aires university classifies the causes of factory occupation as follows: 
28% extraction of the machines by the owners, 27% bankruptcy, 21% layoffs, 21% unpaid salaries 
and 3% other causes (Neuville 2005). 
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their jobs and recover unpaid salaries. Ranis sees the takeovers of factories and 
businesses as a direct result of the economic crisis prevalent in Argentina since 
the late 1990s.  
As the crisis intensified so did the response of a portion of the 
[Argentinian] working class … worker-occupied enterprises became a 
clear alternative to rising unemployment and increasing working-class 
impoverishment, while making a strong argument for keeping alive a 
critical productive sector of the domestic economy. (Ranis 2005). 
The closures meant the workers were abandoned, with little hope of 
finding a replacement job. Worse, in most cases, they were left with an 
accumulation of unpaid salary, and had made other sacrifices in the hopes of 
saving the company. There is substantial evidence9 that the majority of 
bankruptcies were fraudulent; used by employers as a pretext to decapitalize their 
firms, extract government credit and deprive workers of their earnings (Ranis 
2005). 
 The factory takeovers took place in this climate of hopelessness and 
insecurity. They were spontaneous defensive acts by desperate groups of workers 
(Fajn 2003). The crisis caused a rift among employees. The majority of managers 
and professionals left in the wake of the shut down or following the bankruptcy 
declaration; some of them stayed loyal to the employer, but a few decided to join 
the workers and fight back. Unlike the managers and the skilled workers, who 
could market their skills as specialists, the workers had very little, if any, chance 
of finding new jobs. The only hope for the unskilled employees was to defend 
                                                 
9
 One can examine representative accounts of the personal stories of these takeovers and their 
circumstances in the works of ‘The Lavaca Collective’ (2007) and Marina Sitrin (2006). 
Additional valuable articles are available in the Argentinian sections of the websites of Upside 
Down World  http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/category/5/14/32/ and RISAL: 
http://risal.collectifs.net/spip.php?mot70 
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their workplace, try to bring it back into production and thus save their jobs. In 
some cases, workers were initially hoping to restart production under the 
employer’s control or place the workplace in the hands of a new capitalist willing 
to buy their enterprise; in others, they were only demanding that the employer pay 
their due wages. 
  
Old reality delegitimized, new one legitimized 
The movement of factory takeovers was born out of a pragmatic process 
without ideological predetermination; it was not the result of a developed 
consciousness within the working class. The radicalization of the workers would 
come later on. As Neuville suggested, it was the crisis of capital that shifted the 
axis of struggle. Workers were forced to go beyond the question of wealth 
distribution and reconsider existing relations of production (Neuville 2004). With 
their livelihood at stake, workers were confronted with an existential crisis; from 
that moment they started to question the ‘sacred’ principle of private property, a 
foundation of the capitalist system. As the crisis endured and both employers and 
the state seemed unwilling or incapable of providing a reasonable solution, 
workers started to take control of their workplaces, following examples set by 
their fellows10. The crisis of capital legitimized these actions and allowed the 
                                                 
10
 Fajn traces back the earliest company recoveries to the 1990s, citing the cases of IMPA (1998), 
Yaguané (1996) and POLIMEC. These early examples paved the way for the waves of factory 
takeovers following the crisis of 19-20 December 2001. Some of these, such as IMPA, actively 
helped other factories in the process of takeovers and showed high degrees of solidarity. In the 
cases of Brukman, Crometal, Chilavert and others, IMPA workers offered help, advice and 
actively participated in the defense of the factories (The Lavaca Collective 2007, 73;108;126-127). 
An overview of the IMPA struggle can be found in the Toronto School of Creativity and Inquiry, 
“Recovering and Recreating Spaces of Production” (Interview). Affinities: A Journal of Radical 
Theory, Culture and Action, Vol. 1 No. 1, Winter 2007 p.33-48. Neuville claims that antecedents 
of the movement existed for more than 40 years; he cites IMPA, Lozadur, CITA, CAT and El 
Progreso.   
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workers, in their quest for survival, to challenge the very basis of the capitalist 
system.    
 The years 2001 and 2002 witnessed the highest intensity in the evolution 
of the movement. The average number of companies in bankruptcy exceeded a 
thousand per year; however, in 2002, the number of bankruptcies sharply 
decreased. The number of companies engaging in recovery processes climaxed in 
2001 (Fajn 2003). The ascendance of Néstor Krichner to Argentina’s presidency 
and economic stabilization lead to a decrease in the number of shut-down 
factories and enterprises and, consequently, the number of takeovers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II: Compared Evolution of the Three Action Levels (Fajn 2003, 9) 
The dynamics of factory recoveries are affected by three levels of action. 
First comes the company’s bankruptcy, the climax of a period of internal crisis in 
the factory. Second is a period of conflict where the workers start to struggle, 
demanding to regain their workplace. Third is the establishment of worker 
control. While examining the phenomenon of worker-recuperated enterprises in 
the period between 1988 and 2002, Fajn found that the three levels of action were 
in parallel evolution until 2001. The year of the economic collapse marked a 
breakdown that lead to a divergence in their development. It was after 2001 that 
the third started to grow exponentially (Figure II). The majority of factory 
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recuperations took place in the period between 2001 and 2003; after that date, 
there was a significant decrease in the number of recoveries, although they did not 
come to a complete halt (Guthmann & Tournon 2006, 15).    
The movement of factory occupations is dispersed geographically over 
more than 16 Argentinian provinces, with a very high concentration in the 
province of Buenos Aires and, to a lesser degree, in the capital, Buenos Aires, and 
the province of Santa Fe11.  The movement is largely concentrated around the 
industrial centers of Argentina. The recovered enterprises are engaged in a vast 
array of economic activities, mainly in the sectors of metallurgy, mechanics, 
printing and the food industry (Guthmann & Tournon 2006, 16), but also in 
sectors like health, printing press, gastronomy and education, among others. 
Before bankruptcy, the companies had between 40 and 100 workers, at an average 
age of approximately 40. Most factories had endured economic hardship which 
had lead to massive lay-offs in the previous 20 years (Guthmann & Tournon 2006, 
16). 
The factory recoveries signalled a revival of militant activism in 
Argentina. Together with the neighbourhood assemblies, the unemployed 
workers’ movements (piqueteros) and the barter (troc) networks12, the movement 
                                                 
11
 The province of Buenos Aires, which is the wealthiest and most populated of the Argentinian 
provinces (14 million), hosts 55.3% of the recuperated factories; it is followed by the federal 
capital, with 17.6%, and Santa Fe, with 7%. The provinces of Cordoba and Entre Rios have 6 and 
4 recuperated enterprises respectively; the rest of the provinces have no more than 3 per province. 
These figures are based on the “Guide to Factories and Recovered Companies” available in Lavaca 
(2007). 
12
 “Neighbourhood assemblies” were regular local assemblies that emerged in many districts all 
over Argentina in the wake of the popular outburst; they were open gatherings where people met, 
debated and tried to come up with solutions to the problems of daily life. They also played an 
important role in mobilizations. Piqueteros are networks of unemployed workers known for their 
tactic of disrupting traffic on highways as a way to pressure the authorities. Seen by some as a 
dynamic social movement, many ordinary Argentinians disdain the piqueteros who – it is said - 
instead of seeking work, prevent others from working with their road blockades. The trocs are 
barter networks that created an informal network of exchange following the corralito monetary 
crisis. All these movements are seen as part of an alternative to the existing order and a 
manifestation of the spontaneous Argentinian revolt (Raimbeau 2006). 
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of recovered factories became one of the manifestations of a new era in Argentina. 
However, what distinguished the movement of recovered factories and earned it 
the respect of many in the middle class is that the recovered factories,  
“have become a durable social and economic phenomenon that has 
garnered the adherence of, or at least the comprehension of, a populace 
that has revalorized the practices of defending the sources of work and 
the struggle for the recuperation of the productive mechanisms of the 
country” (Ruggeri 2006).  
 Conversely, the movement’s successes were largely due to the social 
support they received from the people who legitimized their actions by providing 
logistic and moral assistance. In many situations, the period of conflict included 
an intense struggle in three fields (Fajn 2003):  
• The judicial, in which workers had to win on the legal battlefield in 
order to gain legal standing, usually in the form of a workers’ 
cooperative.  
• The physical space of the factory; the initial occupation of the 
factory following the bankruptcy and the attempts to resume 
production under worker control.  
• The neighbourhood; exercising the pressure of the streets to force 
authorities to take steps to protect workers, essentially by 
expropriating the factory and placing it under worker control. 
This last field of action relies heavily on active local participation by 
members of the community. In many cases, neighbourhoods took part in actions 
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to defend the workers, providing logistical help, food provisioning, funding and 
facilitating the employees’ return to the factory13 (Fajn 2003).  
Worker-recuperated factories and enterprises empower workers and set an 
example for other sectors in Argentinian society aspiring for change14, but, first 
and foremost, the movement allowed workers to regain their jobs and restore their 
shattered lives. “The movement once again situates the social and political 
struggle at the centre of society’s contradictions - that is, the struggle that exists 
between labour and capital” (Ruggeri 2006)  
 
The pattern of factory recoveries: “Occupy, Resist, Produce” 
A pattern for the recovery of factories can be established based on the 
abundant stories available. There are similarities in the stages that each plant had 
to go through before achieving worker management. The slogan “occupy, resist, 
produce” captures the three distinct phases that many worker-occupied factories 
went through (Vieta 2006).  
The workers’ actions stemmed from their basic need to work and feed their 
families. The story of every factory recuperation starts with the owner’s decision 
to halt production in the enterprise, often by declaring bankruptcy. Behind each of 
the recovered factories there is a fascinating story that runs through the intimate 
lives of ordinary, struggling workers who are defending, with great courage, their 
                                                 
13
 The return to the factory is a decisive step in the workers’ struggle. Usually workers were 
chased out of their factories following the bankruptcy. The first step in their struggle was thus to 
occupy the workplace and keep it under guard, in order to protect the factory from dismantling and 
to acquire a strong bargaining position. 
14
 Marina Sitirin’s book Horizontalism (2006), Raimbeau (2006) and John Jordan & Jennifer 
Whitney (2003), offer first-hand accounts of the popular rebellions that hit Argentina and the 
interplay between the various movements. They offer extensive stories by ordinary people and 
militants who experienced the upheavals of 2001 and 2002. 
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right to work15. A shared element in each of these stories is the workers’ sense of 
betrayal following the owner’s decision to declare bankruptcy or cut salaries. For 
many of the workers, these enterprises are the story of a lifetime, the source of 
their livelihood.   
The feeling of betrayal was often nourished by discoveries of the owner’s 
fraudulent tactics and of money extracted unlawfully, often for the owner’s 
personal indulgence. Many of these discoveries were made in the wake of the 
initial factory occupation. Eduardo Lucita from the Economistas de Izquierda16 
(EDI) estimates the number of fraudulent bankruptcies at 1200 (quoted in 
Neuville 2004). 
Occupy. Before workers resort to occupation, they attempt conventional 
means of resolving the conflict. Most commonly, they bring their case before 
labour tribunals, their main concern at this stage being to recuperate outstanding 
salaries and work benefits. Having experienced the owner’s betrayal and the 
inefficiency or corruption of the labour tribunals, workers then start to question 
the legitimacy of private property rights. This paves the way for the factory 
occupation.  
After the physical occupation of the workplace, a shift to a more militant 
terrain occurs. At this stage, workers start to demand that the productive assets17 
of the company be put under worker control and demands for financial 
compensation become secondary (Palomino 2003). The occupation18 of the 
                                                 
15
 The human element in these stories is particularly interesting as Palomino notes, “‘struggle,’ 
‘resistance,’ and ‘solidarity’ are terms that have gained a new dimension in workers’ vocabulary.”  
Again many stories can be found in Lavaca’s work. 
16
 This translates to “Economists of the Left”. 
17
 At this point, legal title to these assets is still held by the owner or the board of trustees in the 
bankruptcy procedures. 
18
 Guthmann and Tournon mention the case of Sasetru, a factory that was occupied on the 
initiative of the piqueteros and leftist parties twenty years after it was shut down. In this case, the 
issue was not simply protecting existing jobs, but creating new ones! 
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factory is a catalytic moment, it is the first unifying experience for the workers; it 
represents an early, fragile victory and paves the way for the workers’ 
radicalization. The occupation is also an escalation that transforms into a tool in 
the workers’ hands to exercise pressure on authorities in negotiating a solution.  
In some cases, the workers were unable to occupy the factory; instead, 
they camped in front of the company and used tactics like picketing (road 
blockades) to attract public attention, exercise pressure on the owner or the 
authorities and to guard the plant.     
The physical occupation of a factory stops it from being emptied and 
decapitalized. The workers’ presence prevents the owner from smuggling out the 
machinery, the inventory, or other company assets. Occupation also moves 
workers toward concrete and direct actions; it is the starting point of a process of 
radicalization. In the occupied factory, workers meet, debate and start planning for 
the future. In doing so, they start a process of reflection that affects future 
decisions and the organization of the factory management. 
Since 2003, however, the number of cases in which the workers were able 
to successfully negotiate a solution with the owner or the judiciary without 
resorting to occupation increased. This marks a social consensus over the struggle 
for factory recuperation as well as the experience workers acquired in these 
situations (Guthmann & Tournon 2006, 18). 
Resist. After the occupation, a phase of resistance starts, in which workers 
face the danger of exhausting their resources in the prolonged conflict. Until they 
find a way to re-start production, the workers are left without income. This period 
is fatiguing for many of the employees; those who are not capable of enduring this 
harsh period lose faith and abandon the struggle. It takes extraordinary will for the 
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workers to continue the struggle during this period, especially because the future 
is uncertain and the outcome not guaranteed. For many workers, the possibility of 
recovering the factory seems highly doubtful during this phase. It is important not 
to forget that the working class in Argentina has been demoralized by decades of 
regression, corruption of unions and deindustrialization.  
Resistance is another name for survival, which is the essence of the 
movement of recovered factories and enterprises. Combativeness is an essential 
characteristic of the movement and the case of the Bauen hotel in Buenos Aires, 
whose workers are facing an eviction threat for the third time, is exemplary in this 
respect. The Bauen workers rely on solidarity from the community and on the 
help of other recuperated factories to defend their workplace. The election of the 
right-wing mayor Mauricio Macri, who took office in December 2007, was a 
challenge to the worker cooperative managing the hotel. Macri is avowedly 
opposed to occupations and promised to evict the workers. Resistance has taken 
the form of street protests, rock concerts and other shows of communal solidarity 
for the workers (Trigona 2007). 
The links workers establish with their hosting community have turned out 
to be vital in many instances. By opening up the factories to the community and 
actively participating in cultural and social activities, the workers strengthen a 
mutual sense of belonging between them and their neighbourhoods. A worker in 
the Zanon ceramic factory (now run as a worker cooperative under the name 
FaSinPat19), expressed his conception of this relationship: “we always said the 
factory isn’t ours. We are using it, but it belongs to the community” (Lavaca 
2007, 57). Many of these companies serve as cultural spaces open for use by the 
                                                 
19
 Short for Fabrica Sin Patron, meaning “factory without boss”.  
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general public; this is the case of IMPA, which offers its health centre services to 
the public (Toronto School of Creativity and Inquiry 2007). Ruggeri calls this 
concept the “open factory”, a practice that is absolutely antagonistic to capitalist 
notions of business (Ruggeri 2006). Opening the physical space of a business for 
communal activities is counterproductive from a business perspective; such 
practices are alien to the logic of profitability and hence at complete odds with the 
capitalist enterprise20. 
These gestures generate public sympathy; the public then becomes more 
sensitive to the workers’ demands; and this is translated in turn into actions of 
solidarity, such as the rally of support for the Bauen hotel on August 5th, 200721. 
The support offered by the community is not merely symbolic; it is often 
translated into concrete action22 (Palomino 2003). 
Produce. The ultimate challenge for the workers is to put the factory back 
into production. This is not an easy task for workers who lack training in certain 
fields, previously populated by skilled workers, managers or engineers, most of 
whom left the plant shortly after the closure. Moreover, the infrastructure was 
usually inadequate. And, to the technical difficulties, were added lack of finance 
and shortage of raw materials. These businesses were burdened by liabilities that 
were transferred to the workers as the new managers of the plant. Access to credit 
was extremely limited. Marketing was another problem for the workers, who had 
to compete in a capitalist economy in which the idea of worker management is not 
                                                 
20
 Ruggeri’s originality stems from his notion of “social innovation” as embodied by the recovered 
enterprises. Ruggeri’s “innovative practices” differ from the technological/scientific breakthroughs 
usually signified by the term innovation. Rather, he points to innovations in practices of collective 
management and solidarity, but also, and above all, to ruptures in the conceptualization of business 
practices, such as the open factory. The propagation of these new practices is considered an 
exemplary value and a remarkable contribution. 
21
 Two thousand people gathered in front of the Buenos Aires central court in defence of the hotel. 
22
 Apart from signing symbolic letters of endorsement, concrete actions documented by Palomino 
range from food donations to mass demonstrations to active efforts to prevent the eviction of 
workers. 
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seen favourably by businessmen (Palomino 2003; Guthmann & Tournon 2006, 
19-20).  
The unusual challenges were overcome with help from various quarters. 
Help came from colleagues in other occupied factories, who were familiar with 
the workers’ struggle and their problems. An important source of assistance came 
from a number of lawyers who volunteered to defend the workers in the legal field 
but were also instrumental in providing lessons in management and administration 
(Palomino 2003). Some help came from academic and professional circles like 
university students, economists and engineers.  
However, the workers were still forced to create new models to meet the 
necessities of the market. Work to “façon” is one of the solutions workers have 
commonly employed to solve the problem of financial lacking, especially at the 
beginning of production (Neuville 2004). Under the “façon” method, the customer 
provides the raw material and the workers are paid for their labour. However, 
these conditions often result in income reductions for the workers; they also 
generate tensions and create a dependency relationship with the client unless 
workers are capable of accumulating sufficient capital to eventually begin 
purchasing raw material themselves.  
 
 
The resilient challenge of worker management 
The workers have to adapt to the new reality of worker management. 
Drawing on the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, Fajn (2003) analyses 
the transformations in workers’ subjectivities. According to Fajn, the workers 
went through a process of progressive internalization during the Menemist period. 
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They produced a new “habitus”; that is, a common perception of reality. The 
precarious conditions of the working class were “the beginning of [the 
development of] a knowledge without conscience, of an internality without 
intention”. The deep changes in the social reality of the workers produced a 
generalized resignation. The actions of the workers grew out of their attitude of 
resignation towards the precarious economic conditions and the impunity that 
enveloped the actions of businessmen, trade unions and the government.  
Worker subjectivity is a recurrent theme in the literature on the recovered 
enterprises. Whereas Raimbeau (2006, 119) sees the dawn of “new political 
subjects”, Ruggeri (2006) notes no substantial change in worker subjectivity. 
Between these two positions, Almeyra (2006, 75) traces the development of a new 
culture of struggle. As Almeyra suggests, the transformation in worker 
subjectivity is cultural, and therefore might require a slow maturation. In the 
treatment of subjectivities, one can sense the influence of Holloway’s thesis. In 
his project for ‘radical change’ without taking power, Holloway (2005) believes 
the foundations of change lie reclaiming a subjectivity that ends the separation 
between the subject and the object created by the subject, thus bringing to an end 
the objectification of the subject’s doing. Power and domination in capitalist 
societies is constructed through the separation between the ‘doing’ and the ‘done’. 
It is constructed by stripping the subject of the ‘done’23; in other words, of the 
product of one’s labour. In this heavily Marxist perspective, asserting subjectivity 
becomes imperative to restore an individual’s power of contestation. The battle is 
not won merely by successfully occupying a factory. The worker-management 
                                                 
23
 By separating the ‘doer’ from the ‘done’ the latter is given an objective existence that is separate 
from the doer, who is the subject. In his analysis, Holloway demonstrates how the ‘done’ is 
transformed into a power that subordinates the doer. While he admits that in fact there are a 
“multitude” of powers, he believes that these are derivatives of the antagonism between ‘power-to-
do’ and ‘power over’, which is the power of capital. 
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challenge proves more difficult, a challenge requiring the transformation of the 
worker and of the logic of economic production.   
 
Beyond legal imperatives: the ethics of worker management  
The theoretical analysis cannot be separated from a set of technical 
problems that constitute a practical and pressing challenge; namely, legal strategy. 
This question constitutes an important element of the debate that has a strong 
impact on the survival of the movement.  
In legal terms, recovered factories have gone through two stages before the 
occupation. The first stage, in which the owner declares his inability to honour his 
debts, is called “concurso preventivo”. The creditors and the employees then have 
to reach a solution which satisfies all parties. The next stage occurs if no solution 
is reached: bankruptcy is declared. Workers have benefited from a legal opening 
in Argentinian bankruptcy law which allows for, under certain conditions, the 
formation of a worker cooperative. In May 2002, a further reform in the 
bankruptcy law permitted workers to resume production under a judicial order if a 
majority are willing to assume the task (Ranis 2005). However, the arrangement is 
temporary; generally, such temporary expropriations are for periods of two years, 
after which the factories can be returned to the owner or handed to a third party. 
The eventual threat of eviction creates an unstable situation for the workers. To 
remedy this state of uncertainty, workers have adopted various strategies, leading 
in two directions.  
Workers have tended to opt for one of two tactical directions to attain a 
legal situation that guarantees stability. The first strategy involves demanding a 
definitive expropriation by the state; the enterprise is then put under the workers’ 
35 
 
management. Only 4 or 5 companies have adopted this strategy although it was 
pioneered by two of the most symbolically powerful enterprises: Zanon-
FaSinPat24 and Brukman. The second route is to obtain the status of a worker 
cooperative; advocates of this option seek to rent the factory or extract an 
expropriation order. The cooperatives are grouped into two politically distinct 
associations, the MNER (National Movement of Recuperated Enterprises) and the 
MNFRT (National Movement of Factories Recuperated by the Workers) (Ranis 
2005). The relationship between MNER and MNFRT is marked by organizational 
rivalry with a political character 
Advocates of these two strategies have engaged in a lively debate. Central 
to the theoretical debate are two competing models: worker management under 
state ownership (nationalization) and worker cooperatives.  
The proponents of worker management under state control are represented 
by the leftist parties who played an active role in the struggles of Brukman and 
Zanon-FaSinPat. Their critiques of worker cooperatives highlight the fact that 
these enterprises remain subjected to the logic of capitalism. Worker cooperatives 
certainly bring more equity to the workplace and transform work ethics inside the 
unit of production; however, the product of the labour remains alienated from the 
workers. The final product, under a capitalist system of exploitation, has an 
identity independent of the worker who produce it. Under these conditions, 
worker cooperatives remain submissive to capital, which defines the rhythms of 
production, timelines and pay conditions - all part of the final cost, which must 
                                                 
24
 The ceramic factory of Neuquen province in the south of Argentina has become legendary. 
Since it was taken over by its workers, the factory has achieved many successes. It exceeded 
previous production levels, hired additional workers and minimized the number of work accidents. 
FaSinPat workers are characterized by their relatively developed class consciousness and their 
high sense of solidarity with other workers. They established privileged links with their 
community and the indigenous Mapuche community who provides them with clay (Zibechi 2006).  
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compete in the market (Lucita 2002). Nationalization is thus proposed as an exit 
from capitalist logic and the legal and political uncertainties that threaten the 
recuperated enterprises; in the view of some, cooperativism is merely a form of 
auto-exploitation.  
The cooperative camp dismisses the idea of nationalization on the grounds 
of impracticality. While the state is unwilling to commit to such expropriations, 
yielding but faint hope for the success of these demands, resuming production 
remains a pressing necessity. The path of nationalization is long and the outcome 
not guaranteed. Under these conditions, worker cooperatives are a practical 
solution that can spare workers further delay. At the same time, this option is 
viewed by many as a more socially acceptable option.  
Cooperatives do not only appeal to the mainstream within the movement; 
some of the most radical elements favour this option. Anarchists and other radical 
elements are critical of nationalization because they regard the state as essentially 
bourgeois and capitalist. By their logic, it would be absurd to put the factories in 
the hands of the very state that lead Argentina into its current situation. In their 
view, the argument for nationalization is only valid when the state truly represents 
the workers. From this perspective, cooperatives are accepted as a legal tool 
allowing workers to maintain production, without adhering to cooperativism as a 
doctrine (Gutiérrez D 2004). Adopting the legal status of a cooperative is no more 
than a practical issue. Although it initiates a new dynamic in the workplace and 
grants autonomy to the workers under a more egalitarian structure it cannot 
resolve the workers’ problems and should not obstruct the pursuit of structural 
reform. 
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Far from the dogmas of leftist parties, the choice to adopt a legal form was 
originally driven by the need to access bank loans, retain relations with suppliers 
and access the formal economy; this is why many chose the corporate form25 at 
the beginning of the movement in the 1990s. It was not until 2001 that public 
policy began to shift as the phenomenon grew and garnered sympathy. This 
allowed the cooperative form to prevail26 (Palomino 2003). The choice of the 
cooperative form is a practical one, often related to the specifics of each situation, 
and does not necessarily emanate from the workers’ social awareness. Neuville 
notes that cooperatives provide a legal status for the recovered factory which 
places the workers at an advantage when facing the previous owners. Since 2003 
the nationalization/cooperative debate has been marginal, with most enterprises 
chose the cooperative form and Brukman joining the MNFRT. Lately FaSinPat 
has been considering the option, although it has not renounced the demand for 
nationalization. 
 
How to approach the recovered enterprises? 
Despite the lack of real unity, the recuperated enterprises will be treated as 
a social movement. First, because the members of this movement continue to 
claim a shared identity, exhibiting pride in their new subjectivity, even though 
they may not share the same conception of it. Second, because this group of 
workers fits a pattern of common action, tactics, and claims. Their actions have 
been contagiously transmitted from one factory to another, with explicit help and 
guidance from prior recuperations. In this regard, the recovered enterprises have 
                                                 
25
 At the time, workers tended to choose the form of a worker-owned cooperative; as Palomino 
noted, some agreed to conditions where they became shareholders. 
26
 Currently 95% of the recuperated enterprises are cooperatives; other legal forms like 
“anonymous societies” (Zanello) and “purpose societies” (Brukman and Zanon-FaSinPat) also 
exist. 
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often acted as a collective seeking a common goal and employing the same forms 
of contestation. The question now is to understand how this movement evolved 
and was transformed into a cradle of rebellion.   
Revolt is not the inevitable outcome of economic deprivation and 
degradation of living conditions; we know that people under various 
circumstances capitulate to injustice. It would be deceptive to depict the 
Argentinian revolt as a long awaited rebellion against decades of economic theft. 
Economics alone cannot explain the birth of movements of social contestation, 
much less their continuity. Perceived as symptoms of malaise, social movements 
should vanish as soon as the crisis is resolved or tempered. From the perspective 
of this paper, it is more interesting to understand the set of factors that triggered 
this specific manifestation in the Argentinian case; to uncover the relational 
variables that can affect the movement, and, in turn, grasp how the latter influence 
workers’ subjectivities and attitudes.  
The approach to the study of the recovered enterprises is dominated by two 
currents. One current sees the movement, above all, as a political vehicle; the 
tendancy here is to emphasize the militant aspect of the movement and regard it as 
the embodiment of a genuine spirit of rebellion. This approach stresses the aspects 
of horizontality (Sitirin 2006), direct action and the process of constructing 
alternatives (Raimbeau 2006; Lavaca 2007). Although these elements are 
definitely striking and represent a stimulating model for contestation, they should 
not be seen as the sole or even principal expressions of the movement. These 
aspects of the struggle represent a mixture of what Tilly (2004, 3-4) calls “social 
movement repertoire” and “WUNC displays”27. They are lapses into revolt, 
                                                 
27
 Tilly defines social movements as an 18th century western development universally 
characterised by three elements: campaign, social movement repertoire and WUNC displays. 
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momentary insurrections that can easily vanish; just as the popular assemblies of 
Argentina have already disintegrated. Social movements can take the form of an 
outburst of political activism, as evident in the Argentinian rebellion. However, as 
Almeyra points out, social change is the result of the slow construction of 
subjects. Slow construction requires continuity of the movement in order for the 
change in subjectivities to be consciously constructed and solidified.   
The second dominant current is mainly preoccupied with the political 
conditions and external factors that allowed the movement to emerge and that will 
determine its success; in the main, adherents to this approach subscribe to the 
tradition of political opportunity structures analysis (Ranis 2006; Fajn 2003). 
Their interest in internal factors affecting the movement is, for the most part, 
limited to the technical and legal difficulties the movement encounters (Palomino 
2003; Ruggeri 2006; Zibechi 2004; Ballvé 2006). The relative lack of analysis of 
the interactions between internal factors and their possible outcomes leaves the 
impression that the movement’s outcome will be determined solely by political 
developments and government initiatives. Beyond the debate between proponents 
of political opportunity structure approaches and resource mobilization 
approaches, it seems important to note, from a normative perspective, that the 
movement is principally guided by internal dynamics, and that this dimension thus 
requires further scrutiny. It is equally important to revisit the political conditions 
in the wake of Kirchner’s first term and of his wife Cristina Fernandez de 
Kirchner’s succession to power in December 2007.   
The focus of this paper is the study of the movement’s continuity. The 
fundamental issue here cannot be reduced to legal technicalities, although these 
                                                                                                                                     
WUNC stands for Worthiness, Unity, Numbers and Commitment. We will explore Tilly in detail, 
among others, in the next chapter.   
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are crucial questions that need to be addressed. Taken in a purely managerial 
sense, such technicalies are not what determine a social movement’s success. 
Beyond technical solutions, a movement’s ability to adapt and cope with 
challenges is defined by its innovative practices.   
Likewise, and despite the importance of the aims of the movement, the 
political agenda adopted by the workers is not central to this inquiry. Indeed, to 
“brand” the broad aims of a movement is not a success in itself; on the contrary, 
this might only cripple the movement. As we have seen above, the workers did 
not begin with a clearly defined agenda, and yet their actions had the most 
concrete and felt impact within recent Argentinian movements.  
A movement’s success is determined on one hand by the degree of 
acceptance it garners among its antagonists and, on the other, by the gains or new 
advantages it can achieve (Gamson 1975, 28-37). It is important not to 
underestimate the symbolic value of the practices advanced by the movement and 
the principles embedded within these practices. Nevertheless, the persistence of a 
movement has little to do with its intrinsic value but is mainly determined by the 
strategies it adopts.  
 
A closing note 
From the perspective of this paper and regardless of the theoretical validity 
of either option, the adoption of a legal form constitutes the basic strategic choice 
at this stage; it is a choice that will not only have implications for the survival of 
the recovered enterprise but also, and more interestingly, for the movement’s 
outlook and future relations, as we shall see in the coming chapter. The debate 
over legal form is very interesting, since it contributes to the radical credentials of 
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the movement and adds new meaning to the workers’ struggle. However, this 
paper argues that, in order to succeed, the movement must go beyond the factory 
walls, forming strategic alliances with other groups, fostering demands and 
pressing for institutional change, and that it must consolidate its standing by 
revolutionizing the culture of everyday life. 
In the literature surveyed for this paper, the originality of the movement is 
stressed; its capacity to confront the establishment and to challenge traditional 
structures is highlighted. Much of the existing literature is devoted to the 
discussion of the obstacles to worker’s management both in the legal and 
technical domains. In the following chapters, a body of social movement theory 
will be exploited to formulate a set of determining factors that can be adopted 
organizationally and strategically in the context of the recovered factories as a tool 
to foster development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spontaneity vs. organization 
From popular outburst to sustained mobilization 
 
This chapter will try to make sense of the terrain of militancy in Argentina, 
situating the recovered factories in relation to the various players and examining 
the prospects for strategic cooperation among them, as well as the scope and 
nature of this cooperation.  
Tilly maintains that social movements should not be considered groups; 
arguing that social movements are “complex” forms of social interaction, he 
proposes treating them as “clusters of performances” (Tilly 1993-1994). The 
social movement invests in various activities such as mobilization, mutual aid, 
building shared identities and collection of resources, but what distinguishes 
social movements from other forms of collective action is their “sustained 
challenges by means of public displays of numbers, commitment, unity, and 
worthiness” (Tilly 1993-1994, 8). This however does not mean that a movement’s 
‘sustainability’ is related to its ‘displays’; rather, it depends on a broader set of 
factors. The displays are the manifestation of the movement; however, what 
makes this manifestation possible is a number of factors that relate, in part, to its 
organizational character. This chapter will try to pinpoint those organizational 
factors and analyse their interactions in the context of Argentina.  
 
An unconscious maturation  
Let us first lay the basis for the movement’s eruption, which might be 
called ‘the foundational moment’. As described in the previous chapter, the 
recovered factory movement emerged in an unanticipated fashion. The workers 
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acted hastily, with improvisation and spontaneity. The movement cannot be 
separated from the economic conditions that engulfed Argentina in the new 
millenium, namely structural unemployment aggravated by the difficult economic 
conditions that left workers with little hope of finding jobs. Hirschman provides a 
useful explanation for the initial response of the workers. In his analysis, he 
explains why individual responses turn towards confrontation and mobilization in 
the absence of what he calls the ‘exit’ option, or the lack of alternatives 
(Hirschman 1970). The inability of individuals to exit the group of contenders 
ensures the absence of defection from the group. Whenever there is a possibility 
of exit, the group becomes threatened by the loss of members who can opt for 
alternatives other than confrontation. Prospects for exiting the crisis seemed very 
dim for workers in bankrupt factories since the crisis was raging all over the 
country. Unemployment reached 30%, meaning that the only opportunity for 
workers to maintain a source of revenue was to preserve their workplaces.  
In a market metaphor, Hirschman compares ‘exit’ to competition and the 
desirable effect of having the option to select among different brands. In times of 
crisis, ‘exit’ represents the option of alternative employment that can substitute for 
the loss of jobs.  The situation in Argentina was characterized by a remarkable 
lack of exit options, with a lack of job opportunities due to the agonizing 
economic situation highlighted in the previous chapter. The workers were trapped 
by the absence of alternatives; we have already seen that unemployment and the 
lack of economic options were key factors in the radicalization of the workers. 
Beyond this immediate, defensive reason for choosing the radical and 
unconventional solution of factory occupations, the actions of the workers may 
have been triggered at a more subconscious level. Tarrow argues that groups are 
44 
 
likely to mobilize in a situation of general confrontation where many actors are 
challenging the power structure; that is, a situation similar to the social and 
political landscape of Argentina in the early 2000s. In such a situation, when elites 
are faced by multiple threats from various contenders, the climate is encouraging 
for parties to engage in confrontation. Tarrow argues that those who risk high 
losses are more likely to engage in contentious politics, since they are the ones 
who might pay most heavily for their inaction (Tarrow 98, 85-87). Workers in 
Argentina, who used to earn one of the highest average incomes in Latin America 
and enjoy stable jobs and salaries, were indeed at risk of being stripped of these 
privileges due to the shutdowns. 
In combination, the lack of exit and the high risks of inaction provide a 
convincing account of the initial motives of the workers. In order to extend the 
analysis beyond the causes that sparked the recovered factories movement, to the 
determining factors affecting its continuity, the next section will examine a set of 
factors that are internal to the movement.  
 
Organization  
The efficiency of a movement can be affected by the type of management 
it adopts. The art of management has been refined by enterprises; similarly, 
political parties have devoted much of their energy to determining their 
organizational lines28. In various instances, these choices proved essential to the 
success of the organizations. A dilemma connected to the question of organization 
muscled its way into this analysis due to some findings which suggest that 
                                                 
28
 A well-known and powerfully illustrative example is the famous dispute between Lenin’s 
Bolsheviks and Martov’s Mensheviks over the issues of party membership and organization. Lenin 
had addressed the subject in his pamphlet “What Is to Be Done?” 
http://marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/index.htm  
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movements adopting more centralized or bureaucratic structures (or, better, a 
combination of both) have greater chances of success. One of those who 
suggested such a correlation is William Gamson in his pioneer research on ‘social 
protest’ (Gamson 1975, 89-109). 
Gamson’s work included a study of the interaction of three organizational 
types: bureaucracy, centralization and factionalism. His meticulous sampling of 
movements of contestation in the US, drawn from a wide range of data, allows 
Gamson to study a representative cluster of familiar social movements of the era. 
From the historical material in his hands, he was able to construct the profiles of 
the various samples in his cluster in order to study them. When it came to the 
question of organization, his research showed that, statistically, the bureaucratic 
and centralized groups had greater success in achieving their aims and in 
garnering recognition from opposing parties. Centralized groups came out on top, 
with the rate of centralized groups achieving ‘new advantages’ double to that of 
decentralized groups; 64% as opposed to 32% (Gamson 1975, 94).  
In his analysis, Gamson suggested that bureaucracy enables groups to 
preserve a high degree of combat readiness, which makes it easier to mobilize 
supporters, mobilization being a crucial factor in the conditions of political 
conflict that characterise social movements. Centralization, on the other hand, is a 
remedy to dissent; it prevents factionalism to a great extent, but does not 
completely eliminate the possibility of schisms, which were still common in 25% 
of the centralized organizations he surveyed (Gamson 1975, 107-108). Again this 
analysis was backed by figures showing a 75% success rate for centralized and 
bureaucratic organizations in contrast to a 15% rate for decentralized and non-
bureaucratic cases (Gamson 1975, 95).  
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One can raise many objections to Gamson’s work, its limitations, and its 
relevance to social movements today. Conway, for instance, argues “that social 
movements are also sites of practical experimentation and innovation and of the 
production of new knowledges that respond to the crises they signal and the 
questions they provoke” (Conway 2004, 21); this vision of contemporary social 
movements leaves little room for highly centralized and hierarchical structures 
which are at odds with the essence of such movements. In Conway’s view, the 
popular movements have become more than manifestations of social change; they 
are in fact “bearers of an alternative, pluralistic, culturally rooted social vision and 
project/process” (Conway 2004, 12). She notes that the practices of social 
movements are becoming the foundation of this alternative social vision. This 
view of social movements collides with the archetype of the highly centralized 
organization that proliferated in the past century, and that is no longer 
representative of social change. However, the centralized form of organization is 
still common (though perhaps less hierarchical than in past years) and is still 
widely believed to be advantageous in terms of efficiency.  
It is difficult to weigh the advantages of centralization and bureaucracy, 
but a minimum of organization, that enables efficient mobilizing, is always 
required. From an ethical point of view, this ought not to be achieved at the 
expense of the democratic relations which characterize grassroots organizations. 
Nonetheless, an essential lesson can be drawn from Gamson’s work: while 
decentralized and non-bureaucratic organizations still have a chance of success, 
these chances evaporate when the organization is plagued by factionalism. The 
key issue is thus to preserve the unity of the movement and ties of solidarity 
between its members, however loose its power structure may be. A horizontal 
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movement can still achieve the goals of mobilization and preserve high and 
genuine voluntary commitment from its members, but the prerequisite for this is 
avoiding fragmentation; the antidote being solidarity.   
 
The family of worker-recovered enterprises 
The reality of the recovered factories of Argentina is not that of a 
homogeneous movement. As Fajn stresses, the student of the movement should 
not consider it as an ontological unit. Understanding the diversity within the broad 
movement is important to avoid generalization. The distinct characters of the 
movement are reflected in the various directions taken by organizations which 
have attempted to unify the movement. The first attempt to congregate the 
workers of recovered enterprises on an organizational platform was the National 
Movement of Reclaimed Companies (FENCOOTER). This was a short-lived 
experience, soon followed by the MNER (2002) and the MNFRT (2003) that, 
between them, currently concentrate most of the recovered factories under their 
banners. The base of the former is located in the city of Buenos Aires and part of 
the interior zones; while the latter draws its base from the Province of Buenos 
Aires (Lavaca 2007, 211; Neuville 2005). The MNER is headed by Eduardo 
Murua, the MNFRT by lawyer Louis Caro and their relationship is one of rivalry. 
Observers like Ranis (2005) have noticed a great deal of loyalty to the leadership 
within each network. Zanon-FaSinPat and a small group of factories in favour of 
nationalization remain outside these structures and stand for yet another 
alternative.  
In summary, the movement is split into three organizational groupings. A 
handful of companies, including the emblematic Zanon-FaSinPat, adhere to a 
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loose decentralized network, but are still among the most supportive and active in 
providing help to other workers. The other two groups have central leaderships, 
with Caro playing a particularly controlling role in his organization.  
The head of the MNFRT appears to be a problematic figure, according to 
many who have examined the movement. Andres Ruggeri, a philosophy professor 
and a proponent of workers’ self-management, considers Caro to represent a soft 
tendency within the movement; he is close to the corporate world, the Catholic 
Church and the Peronist right (quoted in Raimbeau 2005). Maria Trigona accuses 
Caro of becoming the new boss of the workers, of taking advantage of threats of 
eviction29 or market pressures to co-opt the recovered enterprises, and of de-
politicising the workers by drawing them away from the common struggle. Caro 
ran as candidate for the Christian Democratic Party (Trigona 2006).  
Caro’s style of personal leadership, along with his emphasis on limiting 
the commitment of workers to the internal life of the enterprise, is seen as a threat 
to the unity of the movement. Ruggeri (2006) criticises the attitude of the 
MNFRT, blaming it for becoming a surrogate managerial body, and for 
hampering the move to self-management through the poisoned managerial 
expertise it offers in exchange for legal and political assistance. A more 
sympathetic account of Caro is given in Lavaca30.  
Despite the rivalry that characterises the relationship between MNER and 
MNFRT, a sense of larger unity is maintained and at times the two have come 
together to fight one combat. This was the case in 2004, when they triumphed in a 
                                                 
29
 Trigona and Raimbeau point to the case of the Brukman factory that once was representative of 
the radical tendency within the movement but was recently co-opted by Caro’s MNFRT after 
police evicted the workers. Brukman was associated with leftist parties and drew the attention of 
many activists worldwide; its case was highly publicized. 
30
 The crucial role Caro played in a judicial settlement involving the newspaper Comercio Y 
Justicia is highlighted (Lavaca 2007, 201-203).  
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legal battle that lead to the definitive expropriation of thirteen cooperatives now 
under worker control (Lavaca 2007, 211-212).   
Minimal cooperation does not prevent solidarity. The workers of all 
factories associate with a common cause; the support they provide each other is 
witness to this fact. However, the legalistic case-by-case approach of the MNFRT 
endangers the unity of the movement, especially because it is coupled with an 
avowed apolitical outlook. The major threat of fragmentation seems to arise from 
this isolationist trend affecting some sectors of the movement which tend to 
confine their activities to within the gates of the enterprise.  
 
Leaderships instead of leadership 
The omnipresence of Caro and, to a lesser degree, Murua in their 
respective organizations leads to questions about the role of leaders and other 
distinguished individuals in guiding and orienting the movement. Tilly coined the 
term “political entrepreneur” to refer to individuals who, thanks to their 
interpersonal skills and their understanding of the home environment, play a 
decisive role in “planning, coalition building, and muting of local differences” 
(Tilly 2004, 13). However, he remarks with irony that much of the energy of 
social movements is directed at masking this entrepreneurial role in order to 
present an image of spontaneous arousal. In fact, individuals who play a role 
analogous to that of Tilly’s entrepreneurs do exist in the movement and they are 
not confined to the central roles of leadership played by Murua and Caro: 
militants at the factory level catalyze their fellow workers with their sense of 
commitment. The latter are not typical “political professionals”31 (another term 
                                                 
31
 Neuville uses the French term ‘leader interne’ to designate this type of horizontal management, 
which can be simultaneously individual and collective (Neuville 2006). 
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coined by Tilly), they rose to their current standing through spontaneous respect 
for their exemplary conduct and they remain on an equal footing with the rest of 
the workers.  
A perfect example is Raul Godoy from Zanon-FaSinPat (his case is best 
illustrated in Lavaca 2007, 45-63). Godoy, who gained the trust of his comrades 
and became a famous symbol of their struggle, remains committed first and 
foremost to the factory’s workers’ assembly. For instance, Godoy, who is a 
member of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (PTS), refrained from using his 
moral capital or that of the factory for his party’s electoral campaign, chosing 
instead to abide by a decision voted in the factory that prevents workers from 
running in elections. Godoy is not an isolated case32 in which a factory 
representative or spokesperson has remained committed to grassroots democracy 
despite having attained a privileged status among colleagues. Under this style of 
collective leadership, workers can capitalize on the charisma and talents of certain 
individuals without conceding the principle of collective decision-making. This 
type of ‘leadership’, that is based on individual initiative but equally imbedded in 
the cooperative spirit, is very efficient in confronting challenges and cementing 
unity among workers.   
 
Worker solidarity and community support 
An early comprehensive approach to the question of mobilization from the 
rational choice perspective was provided by Anthony Oberschall in 1973 
(Oberschall 1973, Chap 4). The Oberschall approach organized communities 
along a vertical line based on the nature of the existing links between them. The 
                                                 
32
 Pioneer individual roles are common in the stories of recovered enterprises, yet the supreme will 
remains embodied in the assemblies. A good collection of these stories is found in Lavaca and 
Sitrin. 
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vertical dimension comprised two categories:  “integrated”, where there is 
mobility between groups, allowing gifted and ambitious elements to ascend to a 
higher status, and consequently causing a drain of resources from the community; 
and “segmented”, which does not allow for upward mobility, and hence denies 
elements capable of energizing the community an exit option (to use Hirschman’s 
model). As we have seen, and for reasons that have more to do with severe 
unemployment and persistent economic crisis than Oberschall’s definition of 
segmented collectivities33, Argentina’s recovered enterprises resembled the 
segmented type of community, which is favourable to mobilization.   
 Horizontally, the scheme is divided into three categories of internal 
association. Societies move from the “communal organization” model, which 
characterises underdeveloped societies with traditional social structures, to the 
“associational organization” type most characteristic of industrialized societies, 
and, in between, Oberschall places the “un-or weakly-organized” type.  The 
communal model relies on kinship, ethnic, tribal, village, or other forms of 
community. The associational model relies on special interest associations and is 
based on dense networks of occupational, religious, economic, civic and other 
forms of association. However, the transition from the communal to the 
associational model of organization does not necessarily have to go through a 
period of disorganization in which the first model is totally decomposed and the 
latter not yet formed. Oberschall is highly critical of some theories of 
modernization; he stresses that communal and associational forms are not 
mutually exclusive. This framework fits the current case; while most recovered 
factories are organized according to professional associations defined by common 
                                                 
33
 Worker mobility from one group to another was not hampered by structural constraints as 
suggested by Oberschall but by the economic crisis that imposed a static dynamic of mobility.  
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status and common interests as labourers, they have also benefited from existing 
communal ties of solidarity which have provided moral and material support and 
at times have become actively engaged in the process. These communal ties were 
best expressed by the “neighbourhood assemblies”34. The collaboration is 
depicted in many accounts, including Sitrin (14-15). 
 
Vertical dimension: 
links between                 
collectivities 
Horizontal dimension : links within the collectivity 
Communal          Un-Or                       Associational 
Organization      weakly-organized  Organization 
Integrated 
Segmented 
A B C 
D E F 
 
Figure I: Oberschall’s Classification of Collectivities (Oberschall 1973, 120) 
 
Figure I provides an illustration of Oberschall’s scheme in a table format 
with six categories.  The recovered factories would be located close to the F 
category; a segmented society with associational ties. However, still in accordance 
with Oberschall’s theory, this is also a case in which a not fully modernized 
society preserves viable communal relations. Whereas category F societies, 
characterized by highly developed, modern, associational ties, are the best 
equipped for mobilization, “communal relations can be the foundation and 
breeding ground for the rapid growth of modern associational networks” 
(Oberschall 1973, 123)35. Worker solidarity and communal support offer a 
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 Although these assemblies erupted spontaneously and quickly collapsed, due in part to 
factionalism practised by a minority of activists from competing leftist parties, they provided a 
favourable atmosphere for mobilization (Sitrin 2006, 10-11). 
35
 The Landless Peasants’ Movement (MST), a movement that has been cited both as peer and 
inspiration for the recovered enterprises, has developed an appealing approach to the question of 
mobilization well-suited to the context of rural Brazil. Instead of basing adherence to the 
movement on single workers as individuals, they opened the movement up to peasant families and 
professionals such as priests, teachers, agronomists and lawyers. This allowed them to rely on a 
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network of support and basis of mobilization for a group locked into social 
immobility.  Enlarging the network of social support can reinforce workers’ bonds 
of solidarity and give a larger meaning to their struggle by allowing people to 
identify with their cause. Furthermore, the active support provided by the 
community is probably the most sustainable and valuable source of reinforcement.    
 
Challenging political stagnation    
The Oberschall scheme is useful in explaining the dynamics of 
mobilization and their organizational foundations but it falls short in its treatment 
of an aspect important for the recovered enterprises related to identity formation. 
Conway (2004) and Gamson (1992) departed from Melucci’s work in noting the 
importance of identity formation in social movement processes. The movement of 
recovered factories has been engaged in a re-definition of meanings and the 
creation of a new identity for workers, the vast majority of whom were previously 
de-politicized. Gamson (1992) highlighted the role of ‘consciousness’ in 
challenging the influence of institutions such as the state and mass media on 
society. The dominant ‘quiescent’ political culture produces a seemingly ‘natural 
order’ that is difficult to bring into question, “[I]t is an achievement, then, for a 
challenger to force the sponsors of a legitimating frame to defend its underlying 
assumptions” (Gamson 1992, 68). For Gamson, merely throwing into question the 
hegemony of the dominant and institutionalized discourse is a noteworthy 
accomplishment and a relevant dimension of a movement. A new worker 
                                                                                                                                     
larger and more diversified pool of support and maintain the status of “mass movement” rather 
than organization (Wright & Wolford 2003, 75).  
54 
 
subjectivity is therefore a way of defying the ‘natural order’ imposed by 
neoliberalism36.  
Despite its diverse nature and heterogeneous composition, the movement 
of recovered factories has largely succeeded in building ties of solidarity within 
the factory or enterprise based on an associational, horizontal organization and in 
garnering the support of communities and neighbourhoods. Those ties are 
precious for the movement and crucial for its future.  
The recovered factories have demonstrated their understanding of the 
importance of these factors through their commitment to collective decision-
making, their devotion to serving the larger community37 and through the concept 
of ‘the open factory’. The movement has produced a new consciousness that 
captured the imagination of many in the world. The development of this 
consciousness can be the key to success. As Gamson wrote, “[a]dopting a 
collective action frame involves incorporating a product of the cultural system-a 
particular shared understanding of the world-into the political consciousness of 
individuals” (Gamson 1992, 74).  
 
Framing or the transition from worker into militant 
“Movements function as carriers and transmitters of mobilizing beliefs and 
ideas, to be sure; but they are also actively engaged in production of meanings for 
participants, antagonists, and observers” (Snow & Benford 1988, 19838). 
Movements are thus constructed through a process of framing that entails three 
                                                 
36
 The global interest in the movement and the iconic stature that it acquired among globalization’s 
critics testifies to the movement’s powerful symbolism. It is interesting to note the abundant 
cinemography that takes the movement as its inspirational object; a partial list of this ‘militant’ 
cinema can be found at the following link: 
http://mujereslibres.blogspot.com/2007/12/new-films-from-grupo-alavo.html  
37
 Hence the many cultural, social and service centers that were opened by several of those 
enterprises and put at the service of the community. 
38
 This essay appeared in International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1, p. 197-217. 
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main tasks according to the seminal work of Snow and Benford (1988, 199-204; 
1992, 136-141) on the subject. “Diagnosis” is the preliminary task; it consists of 
identifying the problem and attributing blame for it. The second task is what the 
authors call “prognostic”; it goes beyond suggesting solutions, to identifying 
strategies, tactics and targets. Although diagnosis and prognosis produce a 
consensus on the causes of and solutions to the problem, they do not necessarily 
lead to mobilization. The third task is thus the elaboration of a rationale for action 
or a frame of “selective incentives”39 for individuals to participate in mobilization 
(these include “material, status, solidarity and moral inducements”). For a 
movement to be effective, it not only has to produce a consensus on the diagnosis 
but equally the prognosis. An homogeneous perception of the problem and the 
solutions is the underpinning of a coherent movement; efficient mobilization 
further requires the framing of a rationale for action that resonates with the 
movement’s logic and its cultural and social environment.  
It is interesting to apply Snow and Benford’s framework to the various 
factions of the recovered enterprise movement, mainly the MNER and MNFRT. 
The two networks share a critical view of the Argentinian corporate economy and 
mainstream political parties; they are both in favour of worker cooperatives as an 
administrative solution40. Nevertheless, they are fundamentally divided over 
strategy. The MNER is more politically and ideologically oriented; it sees the 
problem of recovered factories as part of a structural economic dysfunction. The 
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 Quoted in the text in reference to Fireman & Gamson, “Utilitarian Logic in the Resource 
Mobilization Perspective” in Zald, M. & McCarthy, J. The Dynamics of Social Movements, 
Cambridge: Winthrop, 1979.  
40
 The transformation of enterprises into worker run cooperatives is a generally accepted solution; 
even the most radical elements at least perceive that it is the best possible solution in the current 
circumstances. 
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MNFRT, under the auspices of Caro, developed a more legalistic and pragmatic 
approach based on a case-by-case analysis.  
The MNER has an avowedly militant outlook. Although it retains full 
autonomy from political actors, it preserves friendlier ties with leftist parties. The 
organization opposes the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiative, 
criticises the neoliberal order led by the US, considers itself to be part of a 
national working class movement demanding far-reaching reform, demands the 
legitimization of cooperatives and calls for a state-funded program in support of 
the recuperated factories.  
Caro’s organization avoids engaging in political issues and taking 
positions on global issues. The MNFRT seems more reconciled with the capitalist 
economic order. Its approach is focused on the salvation of each factory 
independently. Efforts are centered on resuming production, since, once a factory 
is actively run by its workers, authorities will not dare dismantle a process that 
provides employment, generates profit and distributes income. Caro regards the 
workers as having ‘not abandoned’ the factories rather than having occupied them 
and stresses the constitutionality of the ‘right to work’ (Ranis 2005). This reflects 
a less combative attitude which is attributed to Caro’s personality and influence.  
The disagreement over prognosis between the two major bodies of 
recovered enterprises holds a potential for weakening the movement as a whole. 
This divide contributes to the murkiness of the prognosis and consequently affects 
the framing of the mobilization rationale. The workers have demonstrated a great 
deal of solidarity that was nurtured by their common grievances and imminent 
economic distress. However, to maintain a potent drive for mobilization, workers 
need to maintain a rationale for mobilization that echoes their basic needs as 
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individuals, their rights as a social group and their emerging identity. This 
message has to avoid burdening the workers with political agendas that go beyond 
their capacity as daily struggling toilers; nevertheless, a sense of larger solidarity 
and the new meaning and inspiring41 identity that the workers have acquired can 
serve as a source of pride and empowerment. The danger of fragmentation and of 
isolation within the borders of one’s factory or enterprise threatens mobilization 
and the shared identity that the workers have constructed. This needs to be tested 
in the context of a call for mobilization in a future situation of relative stability, in 
which workers do not feel the pressing threat of an apocalyptic loss of security 
that has hitherto been a major incentive for mobilization.  
 
Politics in the factories 
It is normal for a protagonist to seek strategic alliances or partnerships. 
This holds for social movements, who seek to exert pressure on their antagonists 
and must repulse counter-pressure from those same antagonists. Support from 
observers and other third parties42 is invaluable for the cause; it is necessary to 
legitimize the movement’s demands and assertions and to provide a larger 
coalition which can bring support and strengthen mobilization for specific actions. 
External allies are a potential source of support at strategic conjunctures; however, 
such alliances are often bought at the expense of the movement’s independence. 
In the case of the recovered enterprises, for instance, the unions and leftist 
political parties appear at first glance to be the natural allies of a worker-based 
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 The movement enjoys an overwhelmingly positive publicity as witnessed by the many accounts 
available on which we were able to base our research. However it is important to measure the 
impact of international solidarity on the movement itself and the ways in which this solidarity is 
positively contributing, or could contribute. 
42
 That is, individuals or groups who are not directly involved in the movement, although they 
might share some of its goals. 
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movement. However, observers have been highly critical of the unions’ 
uncooperative attitude towards the recovered enterprises (Palomino 2003; 
Neuville 2004; Guthmann & Tournon 2006; Ranis 2005). This critique is mainly 
directed at the CGT, but the CTA43, which is perceived as too close to the 
Kirchners’ presidencies, is not immune either. The mutual distrust between the 
two parties is deep and it is exacerbated by a sense of rivalry and a fear on the 
unions’ side of losing ground to the new, dynamic, and non-bureaucratic 
organizations that have recently attained symbolic proportions. In these 
circumstances, alliances are unlikely to happen between the two parties.   
The attitude of the MNFRT’s head, Luis Caro, does not pull in the 
direction of a politically engaged and self-conscious movement, belonging to a 
broader coalition with an avowedly progressive profile. His tendency is to 
disengage recovered enterprises and to distance workers from political parties. His 
personal background is not associated with the left, which makes the relation 
between his organization and the leftist parties44 somewhat strained.  
Caro’s role is not the only problem. Much criticism has been directed at 
those who are supposed to be most supportive of workers’ causes. The leftist 
parties have attracted a large share of the blame, mostly for their sectarianism and 
their short-sightedness. Naomi Klein ironically remarked, on a visit to Brukman 
that “all the leftist parties had come and hung their flags with their logos on the 
factory front, but no one thought to design a new logo to represent a company run 
                                                 
43
 The CTA (Central de Trabajadores Argentinos), which is a splinter of the larger, historical CGT, 
is perceived as a more radical and combative union than the ‘co-opted’ CGT. Ranis is also critical 
of the two most progressive Argentinian unions, the teachers’ CTREA (Confederación de 
Trabajadores de la República Argentina) and the public employees’ ATE (Asociación de 
Trabajadores del Estado). 
44
 The parties of the radical left (namely the Trotskyist formations) are hypothetically considered 
natural allies because of their sympathetic attitude and their political support.  
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by its workers. That’s why there’s no sign that reads: Brukman, under worker 
control.” (Lavaca 2007, 66).   
Such blame came from leftist figures such as scholar James Petras, who 
spared neither the anarchists nor the Marxists. The capitalist system was faced by 
a deep crisis that put the traditional parties in a precarious situation, having been 
discredited by the events of December 2001. The social movements that emerged 
were driven by popular resentment. But the established leftist parties who stepped 
onto the scene failed to catalyze the revolutionary potentials of the moment.  
For their part, the “horizontalists” - a term coined by the anarchists to refer 
to their approach – were fiercely opposed to any form of political organization 
and electoral activity, dismissing it as hierarchical, while defending the 
spontaneity of people’s actions. This position had the undesirable side-effect of 
containing the movement and preventing it from transforming into a major actor 
capable of coordinating a harmonious and strategic approach to the problem.  
The leftist parties, mainly Trotskyist formations like the Worker’s Party 
(PO) and the Socialist Worker’s Party (PTS), tried to force their own agenda and 
advance leaders from their ranks45. The result was enhanced feuds among 
workers, many of whom felt alienated by these practices.  
Both the anarchist and Marxist approaches were rooted in a belief that the 
crisis would be sufficient to radicalize workers. They assumed, wrongly, that the 
radical actions taken by people on the streets, in the neighbourhoods and in the 
workplace meant that a new kind of awareness had been established among the 
disadvantaged classes (Petras 2003a, 4-8). Events later proved that these actions 
                                                 
45
 Petras states that “while all the Marxist grouplets were active in some form in all the assemblies, 
MTDs, and factory occupations, their initial organizational contributions were more than negated 
by their sectarian tactics, largely dominating discussions, gaining leadership through prolonged 
meetings (the sectarians’ specialty) in which most new militants departed before midnight” (Petras 
2003a, 7). 
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did not reflect a deep-rooted transformation, and the traditional Peronist parties 
regained the terrain they had lost in the wake of the crisis.  
Guitiérrez sums up the impasse with the political actors, beginning with 
the “horizontalists” who, 
“tried to search for a type of politics quite different to the one of 
the traditional parties… But remaining with spontaneity, they were 
unable to develop a political project that could have given coherence in 
the long term to the whole experience of organization from the bottom 
up. And on the other hand, most of the leftist parties insisted in assuming 
the traditional link between political groups and social movement – one 
in which the social movement assumes a passive role, and the “political” 
actor is the one that assumes all responsibility” (Guitiérrez D 2004). 
 
Rallying contestation  
Despite the difficulties in this relationship, it is still a much-needed 
one. The recovered factories must mount political pressure and lobbying 
campaigns in order to effect larger reforms that can provide security in the 
long-term by institutionalizing the workers’ practices. In this effort, the 
recovered enterprises need the valuable resources that progressive political 
parties and other social forces and active movements can offer them. At 
the same time, many latent forces in Argentinian society have been 
inspired by the movement of recovered enterprises. The political parties 
seem to have found new hope in the movement and appear eager to 
cooperate; other social movements shared their fight and have developed a 
sense of kinship. However, these potentials have not been fully exploited 
in a positive manner.  
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In this context, and in a society that has been subjected to 
systematic de-industrialization and decades of neoliberalism, in which the 
radical left has conceded its role to Peronism, the movement is qualified to 
play a bridging46 role (Snow et al, 1986, 467-469). Argentina is home to a 
disjointed mass that is, in Snow’s terminology, “ideologically 
isomorphic”; in addition to the recovered enterprises, this includes the 
leftist parties and other social movements. The recovered factories 
movement could serve as a catalytic focal point for these immobilized 
groups; but, to do so, it must develop strategic alliances on a platform of 
progressive reforms, while preserving its autonomy and not allowing itself 
to be manipulated by external parties for aims that are not in accordance 
with its basic principles.    
Valuable lessons can be drawn from the experience of the Landless 
Peasants’ Movement (MST) in neighbouring Brazil. It is instructive to 
follow the course of this movement and the ways in which it managed to 
weave close relations with church sectors and political parties while 
retaining full autonomy. The MST prudently welcomed the election of 
President Lula in 2002 without succumbing to illusion: fully conscious of 
the limitations, they saluted his victory with great care. The historic 
relations between Lula and his Workers’ Party (PT), on the one hand, and 
the MST on the other, did not mean that the MST had to throw its weight 
behind him. The MST has benefited from the support of the PT and, in 
turn, did lend a hand in the party’s political struggle; however, in this 
relationship, as in all others, the MST retained its autonomy without 
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 As defined by Snow et al, frame bridging is the “linkage of two or more ideologically congruent 
but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (1986, 467). 
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shying away from forging strategic alliances (Wright & Wolford 2003, 
335-339). Relying first and foremost on its own resources and strategies of 
mobilization, it is free to choose companions from the sympathetic forces 
of society. 
Petras, who has worked closely with the MST in Brazil and the 
piqueteros in Argentina, is pessimistic about the future of social 
movements in Argentina. As early as 2003, Petras, who used to advocate 
for alliances between social movements in Argentina, saw a serious 
regression in social movement activities, most of which ground to a halt 
while the recovered enterprises were still struggling to preserve their 
advances, with limited success. He cites FaSinPat as the only factory that 
has not been co-opted in any form (Petras 2003a). For Petras, the impasse 
is related to the resurgence of right-wing politics, the failure of the left and 
the hybrid politics of Kirchner. The following chapter will examine at 
length this point of view from the perspective of a political opportunity 
structure approach.  
 
Pressure and cultural transformations  
Despite the negative and pessimistic commentary of some and beyond the 
rosy and over-optimistic picture drawn by others, the movement resulted in 
concrete and measurable changes in the conditions and attitudes of workers. 
Numerically, the recovered factories saved over 10,000 jobs during a period of 
escalating unemployment; as of 2003, 89% of the recuperated factories were in 
production (Neuville 2005) at an average of 55% of their capacity (Fajn 2003)47. 
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 Fajn estimates that a constant increase was maintained after 2003.  
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Although these gains are symbolically significant, they are not sufficient to claim 
a drastic transformation in workers’ conditions.  
To better understand the significance of the transformation wrought by the 
recovered factories movement, it is necessary to look instead at the psychological 
conditions of workers who had, for years, been exposed to the dominant idea that 
neoliberal, corporate capitalism is the sole possible economic form. Schooled in, 
or at least heavily exposed to, the thoughts of classical business economics as we 
have all been, the idea of workers controlling their workplace seems almost 
hallucinatory, even to some of the most illuminated minds. People subjected to the 
authority of this school of thought under a hierarchic chain of command can suffer 
a systematic degradation of their confidence and their capacity to put their 
potentials to use48. In this environment, the task of worker management itself 
becomes an enormous challenge.  
For the workers to arrive at a point where they were able to free 
themselves from the previous model of production, they had to undergo a 
transformation that deeply reshaped their previous conceptions; a transformation 
that was capable of breaking through what Fajn refers to as their structure of 
feelings.  
“Inside this structure of feelings pride, bitterness, desperation, 
fear, a sense of solidarity and power of class, conjoin; nucleated around a 
basically economic need tending to preserve the jobs. In these new 
factories, the structures of feeling express through new nets of solidarity, 
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 A psychologist who examined the Zanon-FaSinPat factory noticed that stress is the major health 
problem among workers; anxiety is inflated by the factory takeover. The weight of the new 
responsibilities and the constant threats of eviction heavily burden the new managers. “Some 
workers were so used to taking orders that their new responsibilities caused them to suffer stress 
out of fear of failure” (Petras 2003, 11).  
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companionship, major level of participation and commitment and the 
resignification of the learnings” (Fajn 2003).       
Several authors (Fajn 2003; Vieta & Ruggeri 2007; Zibechi 2004) have 
established a link between the intensity of the struggle that precedes the factory 
occupation and the depth of change in the attitudes of the workers. Workers who 
were forced to fight for longer periods and faced serious threats, often of a 
muscled nature, were inclined to adopt a higher level of egalitarianism as the basis 
for their ‘new’ recovered factories. This is partially due to the fact that, in the 
factories that underwent an intense level of conflict, no more than 33% of the 
administrative personnel stayed; the overall average rate being significantly 
higher, with 44% of the administrative personnel remaining (Fajn 2003).  Of the 
enterprises with low intensity conflicts, only 37% adopted an egalitarian basis of 
remuneration; while in factories with high levels of conflict, the percentage of 
enterprises with an egalitarian basis of remuneration rises to 71% (Vieta & 
Ruggeri 2007).    
 
Figure III: Pay Equity Linked to Acts of Occupation or Level of Conflict in the Early Days of the 
ERT (as of 2005) (Ruggeri, Martinez & Trinchero 2005, 82 as displayed in Vieta & Ruggeri 2007, 
40) 
Pressure has strengthened horizontal ties and pushed workers towards a radical 
stance. Workers who went through a period of conflict have in fact cemented their 
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ties of solidarity; as a result, they tend to value the importance of such bonds, 
translating them into egalitarian schemes that further consolidate solidarity. 
  
A closing note 
 To recapitulate the findings of this chapter, the movement seems to have 
been sparked by economic pressures. Both the lack of exit and the high cost of 
inaction motivated workers to take radical action. The movement is characterized 
by non-hierarchic bonds and direct democracy. Far from being a singular, 
centralized unit, the movement is the expression of regional, occupational and 
ideological diversities loosely grouped into several associations. Despite an 
isolationist and mounting antagonism between the MNER and MNFRT, the 
workers have continued to act in solidarity when faced with external threats. 
Nevertheless, the risk of fragmentation remains a major menace. Workers have 
skilfully employed the talents of certain individuals; these charismatically 
endowed individuals rose to prominence, but remained subject to the collective 
will of the workers, with the factory council remaining the supreme decision-
making body. Worker solidarity is the major mobilizing drive in the movement, 
but the workers also rely on local networks of support. They have become a 
motivating force for other sectors in society which has put them in a privileged 
position; benefiting from general support and acceptance, they are able to 
articulate and energise other movements of contestation. The movement’s 
defiance of neoliberalism - through its challenge to property rights - has made it a 
symbol; this would allow it to move to a different level of action if it succeeded in 
coalition-building. The groups of the radical left, although eager to cooperate with 
the workers on an agenda of broader structural change, have failed to overcome 
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the ‘sicknesses’ of sectarianism and utopia. This means that the workers have to 
be prudent in pursuing the much needed cooperation with other parties; a 
rudimentary condition is to retain their autonomy. The pressure of conflict forced 
certain workers to come together in a shoulder-to-shoulder fight; this had an effect 
on their common understanding of their struggle, which was translated into a 
commitment to egalitarianism. 
 The many elements of strength enumerated in this conclusion provide an 
overview of some of the workers’ successes. However, there are major challenges 
ahead which will determine the future of their movement. Most importantly, to 
survive, the movement will need to avoid fragmentation by maintaining a 
minimum of solidarity and a shared identity. The recovered enterprises will have 
to move to a new stage and learn to cope with different challenges, requiring the 
skilful building of coalitions and forging of alliances with similar forces (social 
movements, political parties and so on), while preserving their own autonomy.  
To achieve this, the movement requires a clear vision and a working agenda.      
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 The Political Trap 
Institutionalizing without exiting the arena of militancy 
 
So far this paper has examined the internal characteristics of the 
movement. This chapter will proceed on the assumption that mobilization is also 
affected by the nature of the institutional and political environment that governs 
social relations within a given entity.  
The debate between advocates of resource mobilization (RM) and political 
opportunity structures (POS) theories has often taken on a tone of 
irreconciliability. Indeed, the conflictual nature of the debate between proponents 
of the two approaches seems to have overshadowed a clear-headed assessment of 
what each of these methods of analysis can bring to the study of social 
movements. Far from rendering judgement on the primacy of one school over the 
other, this paper deems both to be a valuable source of input for the case study.  
This chapter will examine the effects of external factors on the continuity 
of the movement. The nature of the political system in Argentina, together with 
the composition of political forces and social actors, create conjunctures that, 
under specific conditions, can foster or hamper mobilization depending on the 
play of events, the permeability of the political system and the balance of forces. 
This chapter is dedicated to the study of the interplay between these factors. 
As demonstrated many times, the RM and POS approaches can be 
complementary. For instance, we have seen in the previous chapter that systemic 
pressures on the previously vibrant industrial sector and the lack of opportunities 
for exit together pushed workers to resort to unconventional protest and undertake 
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radical actions at odds with their “docile”, apolitical profile.  However, this 
mobilization was facilitated by the division and the moral bankruptcy of the 
Argentinian political classes. Mobilization was thus not solely a result of 
subjective conditions. It was also the consequence of rifts within elites and 
political instability, both of which represented opportunities for the spread of 
contention (Tarrow 98, 78-79).  
The political class of Argentina watched idly as five presidents rotated in 
and out of office within 10 days, until a previously little-known governor49 
stepped out of the shadows to take matters in hand. This climate of instability, the 
out-of-control crisis, and the fractures that paralysed the political apparatus, under 
contradictory pressures from foreign creditors on the one hand and popular 
masses on the other, allowed the intensification of conflict. The combination of a 
political opening with a set of subjective conditions offers a larger frame for 
understanding the sudden rise of the movement, with no need to substitute one 
element for the other. 
 
Preliminary assessment of the post-crisis period 
The outburst of popular protest in Argentina in 2001 paralysed the country 
and immobilized the political elites; for a time it seemed as though the 
Argentinians had decided to renounce their heavy political heritage. But, soon 
after the gradual return to normality, the traditional political class seemed to have 
regained much of its hold on society. The 2003 elections witnessed a poor 
performance from the traditional radical left without signalling the emergence of a 
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 President Kirchner was not his party’s favourite candidate. When it became clear that both Santa 
Fe’s governor Reutemann and Cordoba’s governor De La Sota lacked all popularity, the governor 
of Santa Cruz was picked as the candidate for the Duhalde wing of the Peronist party. He was 
elected, with a record low of 23%, only in order to block the return of opponent ex-president 
Menem, representing another Peronist political tendency (Almeyra 2006b).  
69 
 
new alternative that could offer a political umbrella for the social movements 
active in the country (Petras 2003a). This is not to say that nothing changed in the 
political course the country was following. On the contrary, the election of 
Kirchner as president signalled a rupture with the avowedly neoliberal policies 
championed by Carlos Menem. Nevertheless there is a debate over the depth of 
the changes.  
Many tend to credit Kirchner with a new political approach that breaks, at 
least in form, with the Menemist heritage. To be sure he successfully pacified the 
conflict. He also adopted a policy of holding the military accountable for past 
crimes associated with the junta rule50; a firm stance on human rights abuses that 
was applauded. He acted against corrupt judges and renegotiated Argentina’s 
foreign debt; succeeding in extracting financial reductions, lower interest rates 
and more favourable terms of payment. Remarkably, exploiting the absence of a 
leftist alternative, he succeeded in establishing a progressive profile for himself; 
winning the support of sectors of the social movements active in Argentina, he 
symbolically enjoys the benediction of the Association of the Mothers of May 
Square, including their president, the well-respected activist Hebe de Bonafini. He 
also gained the allegiance of sectors of the piquetero movement and the majority 
of unions. In foreign policy, he aligned Argentina with the axis of Chavez and 
Morales and opposed the FTAA (Marra 2007; Almeyra 2006b; Zibechi 2005; 
Lévêque & Bonfond 2005). By the end of his term, his popularity was 
unchallenged and he was able to securely hand the presidency to his wife, Cristina 
                                                 
50
 The atrocities committed by the military regime that governed Argentina from 1976-1983 did 
not lead to criminal proceedings after the transition to democracy due to an amnesty law. By 
annulling this law and paving the way for trials, Kirchner succeeded in diverting attention away 
from ongoing conflicts to matters of the past.    
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Fernandez de Kirchner51, in order to continue what is perceived by many as ‘the 
Kirchners’ second term.  
A provisional assessment of post-crisis Kirchnerist Argentina reveals a 
stalemate; while social forces remained incapable of formulating an alternative to 
traditional political forces, the right was divided and forced to retreat under 
pressure of the massive street mobilizations. Kirchner skilfully filled the void, 
establishing a careful balance by maintaining a populist “progressive” rhetoric 
coupled with symbolic but unsubstantial policy adjustments. This has left the 
social movements in torment, saddled with a president they cannot unequivocally 
oppose, but who is not capable or willing to deliver substantial reform.  
 
The dialectics of social movements 
However, in order to effect change, social movements do not rely on gifts 
delivered on a silver plate: they try to muscle their agenda forward by all means of 
persuasion. A negative, receptive attitude in social activism is an anaemic 
approach. Since social movements are naturally born in situations of conflict, they 
function in relation to three groups: allies, adversaries and third parties. With each 
of these, they can entertain relations of cooperation, competition or conflict 
(Rucht 2004). Survival in such a conflictual environment is largely determined by 
a movement’s skilfulness in delimiting the nature of their relations with each of 
these groups; naturally their capacity in cementing alliances is vital in this regard. 
Such a task of cooperation with like organizations requires “constant efforts to 
create and maintain links, to identify and symbolize common ground, and 
eventually to act together” (Rucht 2004, 203). In the current Argentinian situation, 
                                                 
51
 It is sexist to reduce Cristina Fernandez to a shadow of her husband. However this study was 
prepared at a time when it was premature to judge the continuities and ruptures of the newly 
elected president’s term withher husband’s. Anassessment of her term will be needed in the future.  
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this kind of cooperation is not only lacking, it is replaced by latent forms of 
competition. The landscape of social activism is fragmented due to co-optation of 
some social forces by Kirchner’s rhetoric - which echoes the Peronist populism of 
the 1950s and the 1970s52 - and by clientelistic and paternalistic53 political 
approaches (Petras 2005, 28-59). As Almeyra notes, the marginalized in 
Argentinian society are divided between employed and unemployed; and the 
unemployed in turn are divided between those who are dependent on social aid 
and the piqueteros, who are themselves divided into numerous groupings 
(Almeyra 2006a, 39).  
This highly fragmented landscape of social activism reduces the potential 
for social cooperation with the recovered factories. The working class seems to be 
divided and greatly paralysed by unemployment, and the piqueteros as a social 
group are rejected by the majority of society, whose views of them are very 
negative54. In these circumstances, the working class is in no position to offer 
practical support to the tiny, remote and relatively well off segment of the 
workforce represented by the recovered enterprises. On the other hand, as a 
combative and creative movement, the recovered factories have earned the 
support of many in the middle class, who associate the fight for jobs and the 
recovery of factories with the work ethic they believe to be characteristic of the 
tax-payer petty bourgeoisie, in contrast to the stigma of “laziness”  attached to the 
unemployed piqueteros. Almeyra, in his extensive account of this situation, 
concluded that the petty bourgeois are too frightened of hope to be capable to lead 
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 Historically, the Peronist tradition has played a contradictory role as a vehicle that galvanized 
many who aspired for promised change and, at the same time, an obstacle that prevented the 
effective development of a more radical form of leftist activism. 
53
 Kirchner benefited from the clientalistic network of the Peronist party. He then introduced social 
assistance programs that were not universal and were characterised by a meagre amount; these 
programs seem to be a cheap but successful means for gaining the support of the beneficiaries.      
54
 The piqueteros are perceived by some sectors as a social burden. Check in the footnote in 
Almeyra 2006 page 189.  
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an alliance with other social forces; they are not willing to change anything for 
fear of opening Pandora’s Box (Almeyra 2006a, 40).   
The political opportunity structure appears to hold little promise from the 
perspective of social classes and the composition of economic groups. What about 
political parties? Sectarianism on one hand and the anti-institutionalist55 logic on 
the other have isolated the different parties and left the door open for a return of 
the traditional parties, through their connections to the institutional system and 
their clientelistic networks. The 2001-2002 events made a breach in the wall of 
political structures. However, this rupture in the traditional political domination 
exercised by the heritage of the Radical and Judicial parties has not lead to long-
term positive consequences.   
 Historically, Peronism has used the working class as a vehicle to attain 
and maintain power, its essence lies in the promise of solidifying the national 
bourgeoisie. However, there is a contradiction in Peronism produced by the 
opposing interests of its components and it has often sacrificed the working class 
to satisfy foreign capital (Almeyra 2006a). While the Peronist call for national 
unity and the nostalgia for early Peronism still resonates powerfully with the 
popular sectors, the party effectively prevents the development of an alternative 
working class party. The miserable failure of leftist parties to use the crisis to 
build a legitimate alternative (Petras 2003a; 2005) compounds this by depriving 
the social movements of a solid and reliable ally.  
  
 
                                                 
55
 The spontaniety approach inspired by direct democracy continues to draw harsh criticism, 
mainly from Trotskyist rivals (Dives 2007, Sanmartino interview with Keucheyan 2007). 
Although the lack of pragmatism has allowed a reversal of early achievements, the theoretical 
validity of direct democracy approaches remains pertinent; the difficult task, however, is achieving 
a parallel autonomy capable of detaching from existing authority.    
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The quest for normality or pacification of conflict 
Sociologist Maristella Svampa remarked that, following the 2001-2002 
rebellion, there was a demand for a return to normality among the general 
population, mainly the middle class. This was exacerbated by a media campaign 
and an effort by the government to awaken prejudice and stigma chiefly against 
piqueteros by exploiting some of their tactical errors (interview with Saint-Upéry 
& Geiger, 2006). This quest for security and stability contributed to Kirchner’s 
popularity and caused a sharp decline in the amount of unconventional protest.     
On a theoretical level, in their aggressive critique of resource mobilization 
(RM) Piven and Cloward (1992) have stressed the difference between 
“permissible” and “prohibited” collective action. The general failure of RM 
analysts to recognize this distinction is detrimental to their study of social 
movements, since normative protest is paradoxical to disruptive, non-normative 
forms of protest that characterise the activities of social movements. The authors 
go further in noting that the normalization of protest activity removes such 
movements from the sphere of collective protest. In their analysis, they attribute 
the failure to make this distinction to a number of difficulties – mainly related to 
the nature and accuracy of the available data - in establishing the context in which 
normative and non-normative responses can be differentiated within the 
dynamically shifting historical conditions of each study (Piven and Cloward 1992, 
301-305). 
If one applies such a distinction, the movement seems to have reached an 
impasse with the halt in factory occupations and sharp decrease in other forms of 
disruptive tactics. The political normalization of society has thus coincided with 
the transformation of the recovered factories into a more conventional form of 
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social activism. In similar terms, Petras provides a pessimistic account of the 
situation of the recuperated factories in which he considers the movement to have 
been relatively tamed, apart from a small, isolated sector, the one represented by 
FaSinPat (Petras 2005, 50-52). The reparation of the breach in the political 
opportunity structures was the consequence of the “normalization” that followed 
Kirchner’s election. Nevertheless, this should not be interpreted as a fatal blow to 
the movement; while there seems to have been a regression in protest activity, 
among other disturbing signs, the movement has also generated recognition by the 
state. Petras cynically notes that a ‘respectable’ sector within the movement has 
become affiliated with Kirchner. True, this is hampering the mobilization 
capability, but it can also be interpreted as another sign of formal recognition.  
Normalization has brought relative stagnation to social movement 
activism; in parallel, the new regime was successful in neutralising sectors of the 
social movement, including most of the recovered factories. However, the 
movement’s basic demands haven’t been satisfied and workers continue to live in 
insecurity; the potential for a new outburst of activism thus remains an ever-
present possibility in the event of a backslide in economic conditions or a return to 
past neoliberal measures. Jorge Sanmartino, a radical left activist and member of 
the EDI, concludes that the current cycle of protest is over for now. According to 
him, the challenge is to be ready to exploit the upcoming cycle; he notes that 
Argentina is systematically hit by a crisis every 10 to 15 years (interview with 
Keucheyan 2007).  
Kirchner’s popularity rests on a delicate equilibrium between the massive 
support he enjoys from low income Argentinians and his alliance with a 
traditional sector of the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ). So far, he has managed 
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to protect the interests of foreign investors and preserve the essence of past 
neoliberal policies while offering assistance to the poor, and introducing anti-
corruption reforms to lessen the impact of unrestrained capitalism. The issue of 
past human rights abuses appears to Kirchner-sceptics as an escape from tackling 
immediate and difficult issues of structural reform.  
 
Cycles of protest and instability in Argentina 
Patricia Hipsher is one of the scholars who have treated the cyclical nature 
of some forms of protest that can be related to waves of disruption characteristic 
of periods of transition from one order to another. Under such a scheme, social 
movements are explained by the advent of political change, for example, 
transition to democracy. These transformations generate “dramatic shifts in social 
movement strategies and forms of collective action” (Hipsher 1998, 154). 
Hipsher’s study pertains to Latin America and takes as a focal point the transition 
to democracy as a continentalcycle of protest. Social movements are the first to 
mobilise, thereby inaugurating the cycle of protest by demonstrating the 
possibility for action to other, more hesitant sectors. However, as soon as the 
situation normalises, social movement activism wanes; in this phase, social 
movements “institutionalize” and revert to permitted forms of protest (Hipsher 
1998).  
Cycles of contention produce “master frames” (Tarrow 1998, 145-146). 
These are alternative ‘narratives’ (they can be ideologies but also new or 
transformed symbols and meanings) that are used to legitimize and valorize the 
actions of protesters within the framework of a fresh perspective. Tarrow offers 
the example of the concept of rights, which was skilfully exploited by the civil 
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rights movement in the United States during the 1960s in order to justify their 
campaign for equality. The recovered factories have had a similar but more 
limited success building on the notion of the right to work56. The movement 
became symbolically associated with the re-creation of jobs and hard work; in 
short, it represented an accomplishment and a positive image. The piqueteros 
movement failed dismally to construct a positive symbol in the popular imaginary 
and it therefore remained incapable of overcoming the handicap of the entrenched 
negative prejudice that surrounds its image and deprives it of a wider base of 
solidarity.  
With the return to normality, this opportunity to recreate argumentative 
logic and its symbols will not be as readily available to social movements in 
Argentina. The possibilities of attracting public attention are limited, since the 
media has returned to functioning in accordance with corporate interests and the 
public has once again been drawn into the cycle of daily life routine. 
Nevertheless, the positive association with constructive activism and with the 
right to work seems to be a potential strength that needs to be incorporated into 
the “master frame” of the movement.     
In the context of a transition to democracy, the re-emergence of political 
parties contributes to the institutionalization of social movements. The description 
Hipsher provides of the role played by political parties in this context offers an 
accurate portrayal of what happened in Argentina: “the return of parties affects 
movements by diverting their time and energy from the actual goals of the 
movements to issues of autonomy and party-movement relations, by accentuating 
existing divisions within movements, and by weakening movements’ capacities to 
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 This was mainly advanced by Caro, as Ranis notes (2005). 
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wage unified campaigns.” (Hipsher 1998, 157) From that point on, the cycle of 
protest is closed and the fate of social movements will depend highly upon the 
political opportunity structures. While the action shifts back to the institutional 
axis, the rules of the game begin to disfavour social movements and political 
parties try to resume their role as intermediary between civil society and public 
institutions. Demands now have to be channelled through parties and are subject 
to their political manipulations.  
  
Institutionalization: sacrificing spontaneity  
Normalization brings a new challenge to social movements. With the end 
of a cycle of protest comes the end of high intensity mobilization. According to 
Hipsher, social movements have to adapt to the new setting by compensating for 
the decrease in protest through “institutionalizing”. However, what is for Hipsher 
(1998) or Tarrow (1998, 141-160) a temporal adjustment in an evolutionary 
process, is for Piven & Cloward (1992) a cessation of disruptive protest, and 
consequently a passage to a different organizational form that can  no longer 
accurately be described as a social movement. Piven & Cloward’s critique touches 
on the issue of the subtle distinctions between social movements and other forms 
of contestation including both the more revolutionary and the more reformist 
variants. In fact, between social movements, revolutions and reformist groups lie 
large gray areas which complicate the scholars’ task of defining the subject.   
Social movements usually do not proclaim themselves as such; they do not 
officially register or announce a delimited platform as political parties do. In their 
impulsive beginnings, they are often confused about their goals and strategies, 
which makes it difficult to classify them in orthodox categories. Social 
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movements are nevertheless a dynamic and evolutionary social force, in most 
cases born spontaneously out of extraordinary circumstances. They attract 
admiration by breaking the boundaries of what was not previously permissible or 
imaginable, but the challenge they face is always one of sustaining their 
achievements beyond the duration of the initial extraordinary circumstances. To 
deny social movements the right to an evolutionary process and to demarcate 
them by excessive, academic boundaries goes against the creative process of 
maturation that may open new horizons in activism. Social movements are not 
constant agitators, they are not professional protestors; although they resort to 
repertoires of action in order to achieve their aims, they employ them within the 
framework of a strategy and a vision that must adapt to specific conditions. The 
temporary decrease of protest intensity is not necessarily an end or a 
transformation of social movements, especially in a country that is chronically hit 
by cycles of protest. Yet the end of the cycle brings a major and often lethal - 
threat to social movements.   
With the transition to normality, the recovered factories are faced with the 
dilemma of how to adapt to changes in the political structures that seem to narrow 
the available potential of opportunities. Institutionalization is often proposed as an 
alternative. However, this requires sacrificing a degree of spontaneity, a 
characteristic that initially brought admiration to this group of workers. More 
importantly, how to preserve what is left of the democratic experience in self-
management and direct democracy?  
The answer to this dilemma is to nurture a new, self-conscious worker’s 
identity. FaSinPat has been a leader in this respect, but it remains marginal within 
the larger movement. There is a pressing need for a radical agenda that can bring 
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the workers together around specific goals. Otherwise, unless coupled with a 
constant effort to preserve the nascent subjectivity that was born out of the 
conflict,   institutionalization could lead to a shift of the sort Piven and Cloward 
warned against. 
Tilly warns against other possible dangers. One of Tilly’s assumptions is 
that social movements as a form of contestation are a relatively recent historical 
phenomenon whose early roots lie in the eighteenth century. Contrary to the 
perception of some that social movements are a fixture on the social scene, Tilly 
believes they may vanish or mutate into another from of politics in the near future 
(Tilly 2004, 153). Tilly gambles in predicting a number of possibilities for the 
future of social movements. In this exercise, he foresees that institutionalization 
will play a particularly determining role in the prospects of contentious 
movements. The professionalization of social movements forces a collision 
between the original, unorthodox expression of protest that characterises social 
movements’ displays and a programme-centered approach, led by professional 
bureaucrats, that undermines innovation in movement practices. The 
entrepreneurs, crucial for the success of contentious movements in Tilly’s view, 
carry with them the seed of a future threat to the current form of this type of 
contention. This is especially true if movements continue to draw those 
entrepreneurs disproportionately from social segments characterized by advanced 
education, relative well-being and access to key positions (144-158).  
 
Overcoming stagnation 
Piven and Cloward are right in at least one respect; in the case of lower-
stratum groups who lack the necessary resources for maintaining and developing 
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an organizational structure, institutionalization is not an available alternative to 
the decline in protest intensity - they therefore fail in undertaking such a task 
(315-317). When resources are scarce, continued disruption becomes a more 
efficient tool for groups incapable of institutionalizing (319). Moreover, the 
normalization of daily life might deprive movements of propitious conditions for 
mobilization at sensitive conjunctures, when action is needed to counter concerted 
attacks aimed at delegitimizing the purposes of the movement – such as the ones 
mounted against the piqueteros. With the return to normality, many in the middle 
class who had previously taken to the streets alongside the piqueteros began to 
shy away from supporting the movement; and, as the movement became 
increasingly isolated, the campaign to rally stigmas against it proved fruitful. The 
piqueteros have, through all this, maintained a point of strength; their capacity of 
mobilization. Unlike the recovered factories, and despite their fragmentation, they 
are still capable of taking to the streets and disturbing ‘business as usual’ (Petras 
2005). Their case is proof that mobilization can be more crucial than 
institutionalization.  
 A problem central to the dilemma posed by stagnation and 
institutionalization perhaps lies in the general conception of organization as 
hierarchical and centralized. However, there are democratic alternatives to this 
outmoded organizational type; alternatives that bring people together in a joint 
effort on a horizontal basis. This model is exactly what the workers have been 
trying to apply inside their factories, what is needed is to extend it beyond the 
factory walls. From this starting point, the fundamental question becomes: What 
organizational model to advocate? And the answer would be one inspired directly 
from the workers’ experience in self-management, and consequently one that 
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resonates with the “master frame” of the recovered factories and that empowers 
the workers’ new subjectivity.  
It is important not to allow an exaggerated animosity towards all forms of 
organization while advocating horizontalism. In particular, raising workers’ 
consciousness is a conditio sine qua non for horizontalism, otherwise the loose 
nature of this organizational structure would lead to demobilization. Awareness 
must serve as an antidote to disintegration and as a means of reinforcing cohesion. 
The integration of work and militancy as complementary work organized 
on the basis of self-management answers the dilemma of institutionalization in 
many ways. First, it engages the community in the shared task of defending their 
social rights, allowing responsibilities to be divided and re-allocated to a larger 
number of individuals. Second, by overcoming the boundary between work and 
militancy, it cultivates a new subjectivity for workers. At the same time, it 
eliminates the contradiction between resources allocated for labour and resources 
allocated for mobilization, since militancy becomes integrated in the profit-
engendering effort, as another aspect of daily work.  
The Brazilian MST offers many lessons in this regard. It represents a 
movement of the lower-stratum which demonstrated high efficiency in 
coordinating its actions and maintained a cohesive but also inclusive base57. So 
far, FaSinPat-Zanon is the only recovered factory inclined toward such a culture 
of active militancy, considering the factory as a battleground in a continuous fight.   
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 Wright & Wolford 2003 and Harnecker 2003 are two illuminating works on the MST of Brazil. 
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Clientelism   
  In the case of the recovered factories, the drop in protest intensity has not 
been compensated for by a highly efficient bureaucratization. Instead, as we saw, 
the movement has fragmented into several bodies. Caro reflects the dangerous 
professionalization that Tilly warns against. As a lawyer, he comes from a 
different background from that of most of the workers; his connections with 
Peronist circles and the Catholic Church partly explain his penchant for 
formalistic solutions. Since the return to normality, Caro’s discourse has become 
more appealing to workers ready to compromise with the establishment on a 
legalistic solution. Worn out by the length of the conflict, the workers were 
attracted to the greater flexibility with which the establishment responded to 
Caro’s approach. It is significant that the radical FaSinPat-Zanon remains the only 
recovered factory deprived of legal recognition (Petras 2005, 51-52). Petras 
argues that the explanation for this inflexibility towards FaSinPat-Zanon is to be 
found in the fact that the factory remains immune to state tutelage and 
paternalistic control.  
 Kirchner’s administration followed the Peronist tradition of firmly 
controlling the workers through patronage offered to the working class. Kirchner 
relied on the old clientalistic network that served the Peronist party. The 
distribution of work plans58 to groups willing to declare loyalty is one form taken 
by the assistance programs which, far from providing solutions to the problems, 
help co-opt parts of the social movements (Petras 2005; Svampa 2006).           
 Generally clientelism results in cooptation. Nevertheless, in certain cases – 
such as Brazil’s - it can open avenues for movements to advance their demands 
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 A social assistance program designed to help the unemployed. 
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through negotiations and brokered agreements (Hipsher 1998, 170). The 
necessary conditions for such a result are the presence of strong political allies 
who are genuinely committed to grassroots processes of decision-making, and a 
degree of openness in the political structures allowing for a certain responsiveness 
to negotiations and flexibility towards temporary alliances.  
Argentina does not exhibit either of these conditions. The working class is 
subordinate to the populist approach of the Peronist party. The complicity 
between the traditional parties translates into political decisions that are 
favourable to big national and multinational capital (Almeyra 2006a, 48). The 
political system in Argentina is, to a great extent, inflexible under popular 
pressures; despite the state’s federalist nature, the president enjoys high degrees of 
autonomy.  
It is absolutely necessary for the success of the social movements to have a 
reliable political ally which can break the working class free from its 
subordination to the Peronist party with its clientelistic network, recalling that this 
is the same party that, under Menem, lead Argentina on the path of extreme 
neoliberalism. 
 In Argentina, clientalism has been effectively employed by the 
government to exploit divisions in the social movements between moderates and 
hardliners. The former, being more flexible and cooperative, have been more 
successful in extracting work-plans and other forms of government assistance 
(Epstein, 2006, 104-107). This exploitation of the divisions within the social 
movements has been employed to the benefit of the government. The lack of a 
larger, cross-factional, coordinated front may have deprived the movement of 
greater leverage it might otherwise have exercised over a vulnerable government. 
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In the event, the outcome of Kirchner’s first term was more fragmentation and the 
cooption of large sectors of the social movements.  
 
A complex political landscape   
One of the keys to success for a movement lies in its capacity for bridging; 
that is, the ability to end isolation by fostering strategic alliances that do not 
threaten the movement’s political autonomy. The potential for such alliances does 
not rest exclusively with the movement. . The adoption of a strategy of openness 
by the movement has to coincide with the presence of an appropriate political 
environment such as an opening in the political opportunity structures allowing a 
previously inconceivable reconfiguration of alliances (Tarrow 1998, 89). 
However, Tarrow is fast to remind us that political opportunities are 
untrustworthy allies since they are external to the movement and therefore beyond 
its control; they remain volatile and eventually shift back to favour the high 
stratum.   
The extraordinary conditions of Kirchner’s ascension to the presidency 
lead to the reconstitution of political power on a new basis. The newly elected 
president acted with great autonomy, rapidly undertaking bold measures that 
reasserted his legitimacy. Coming from a marginal position within his own 
political formation, and having been voted into power in an election stained by a 
great deal of scepticism and political apathy, Kirchner appealed to citizens 
through a series of unexpected popular measures (Cheresky 2006, 206). The 
affirmative new president gained phenomenal popular approval; his style of 
leadership seemed to rely increasingly on skilful manipulations that exploited 
citizen support in order to condition political rivals.  
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Surprisingly, the recovered factories and most of the social movements did 
not benefit from such an opportunity to extract structural reforms and long-term 
guarantees.  It is possible to see two reasons for this. In addition to the nature of 
the Argentinian brand of clientalism, the regime was successful in tempting 
various groups to accept individual solutions; in this situation, each group ends up 
bidding for the government’s favour and solutions come at the price of political 
submission. The second reason is the extraordinary support that soon galvanised 
around the president. This allowed him to draw from a large pool of popular 
support and thus weakened the bargaining position of each group standing alone.  
The regime achieved substantial political gains in recent elections. For 
instance, in the 2005 parliamentary elections, Kirchner gained control over the 
legislative body, allowing him greater manoeuvrability59. With the comfortable 
election of Cristina Fernandez in October 2007, the chances for political 
restructuring might have diminished, as the government’s capacity for political 
initiative seems to be increasing. Under such conditions, the leverage of 
contending movements could also diminish. However, if economic pressures and 
social uncertainty continue unchecked, the opportunity for mobilization will 
increase in the future if the government retreats under these pressures.  
 
Institutional constraints and susceptibility to new demands  
Kritschelt (1986) offered a useful paradigm for the framework of political 
opportunity structures based on a dichotomy between what he classifies as 
political input structures and political output structures. Input refers to the 
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 The elections witnessed a victory that consecrated Frente para la Victoria (Kirchner’s faction 
within the Peronist tradition) as the leading force in parliament and marginalised the traditional 
Peronist party Partido Justicialista. Respectively, they obtained 54% and 9% of the elected 
deputies.  
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openness of political systems, meaning the degree of permissiveness for actors 
and new demands to push for the promotion of their goals within their specific 
political environment. Output means the system’s capacity for assimilating new 
demands and processing them; its ability to effectively implement policies across 
various political and administrative constraints. Kritschelt designed a table in 
which he situated four examples according to their classification in his paradigm. 
The input side was divided into open and closed categories, while the output was 
divided into strong and weak (Figure IV). 
 
Vertical Dimension: 
Political output structures 
Horizontal Dimension : political input 
structures 
        Open                            Closed 
Strong 
Weak 
Sweden France 
United 
States 
West 
Germany 
 
Figure IV: Political Opportunity Structures in Kritschelt’s Typology (Kritschelt 1986, 64) 
 
This paradigm constitutes a conceptual framework allowing a summary 
combining the effects of the multitude of external factors examined so far. 
Drawing on the analysis presented in this chapter, a clearer picture of the nature of 
the political system in Argentina and its dynamics can be sketched.  
The recovered enterprises in Argentina were initially faced with a coercive 
attitude by the state. However, the weak credentials of the bankrupt neoliberal 
order in the wake of the crisis allowed social movements to mount a coordinated 
response that was expressed through a generalized sense of rebellion and the 
establishment of alternative economic and social systems. Kirchner’s arrival in 
power altered this situation. At the beginning of his term, he tended to compensate 
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for his marginal position within the traditional political elites - including those of 
his own party - by appealing to popular bases for support. Slowly the Argentinian 
political system was rehabilitated; its clientalistic networks were reactivated to 
serve as an effective co-opting tool that succeeded in securing the allegiance of a 
sizeable part of the social movements. Meanwhile, the hegemony of the Peronist 
party was re-established through the electoral test and Kirchner advanced to an 
unchallenged central role within his party.  
If this direction is maintained in the future, tensions are eventually likely 
to arise between the dynamics of party politics on one hand and the dynamics of 
social contestation on the other. So far Kirchner’s genius lies in his ability to 
reconcile the two. But if traditional party politics regain legitimacy in Argentina, 
the country will shift towards a closed party system responsive only to those who 
are well off. In that case, the future of social movements and of the recovered 
factories in particular would rely on their ability to engage in a campaign of 
protest. This ability in turn will depend on access to resources for movement 
organization, the availability of allies and the capacity for “bridging” between 
various causes.  This capacity to bridge is very important given the relatively 
small number of people involved in the recovered enterprises.   
The tilt towards a closed input system is accentuated by the lack of leftist 
political alternatives capable of challenging the official party or at least of 
channelling the demands of the recovered enterprises or coalescing with other 
social or political actors in order to pressure the input structure. On the other hand, 
the right continues to signal its presence through the rise of politicians like 
Mauricio Macri and Lopez Murphy. While they continue to be eclipsed for the 
moment, they are still positioned to push the direction of public policy to the right.  
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The question of relationship with the established left is highly problematic 
for the social movements. While the leftist competition to Kirchner’s populist 
approach and left-leaning policies is ineffective, association with the ruling party 
is not likely to yield positive results, especially now that the government’s 
position has been consolidated. At the same time, as Kriesi (1995, 53-81) has 
shown, a close association with the radical left may result in the marginalization 
of the movement.  
On the other side of the paradigm, Kirchner’s policies and economic 
choices have assigned a greater role to the state. The government hasn’t been 
reluctant in employing the resources at its disposal or introducing special 
programs like the program Jefes y Jefas60 in order to consolidate its leverage over 
sectors of the social movements and society in general. This has increased the 
effectiveness of the state, given the central part played by the presidency in 
political administration. In these circumstances, the judiciary will play a crucial 
role. The more the judiciary exhibits an independent and egalitarian attitude, the 
larger the capacity for manoeuvring.  
As the political administration shifts towards the closed input and strong 
output combination, the analysis above is born out. The regime is willing to 
implement a limited reform from above. However, unless there is a breakthrough 
in the input structures forcing some sectors of the political elite to take into the 
social movements into consideration, change will depend on the will of a 
comfortable political administration.  
 
 
                                                 
60
 Jefes y jefas is a social assistance program that is directed at the male and female heads of 
unemployed families, it was introduced after the crisis of 2001. 
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A closing note 
The election of Nestor Kirchner seemed to open a breach in the political 
opportunity structures. The rebellion that had destabilized the political 
establishment paved the way for a new face to become president. Kirchner, who 
was at first considered by the political elites to be an outsider, turned to leftist 
populism in order to appeal to the masses. At that moment the presidency was 
vulnerable to pressures from organized social forces.  
However, the recovered enterprises did not push for structural reforms that 
could guarantee long-term continuity for the nascent movement.  The lack of 
common strategy and the absence of an effective coalition of social forces and 
political parties led the vast majority of the recovered enterprises to opt for a 
legalistic compromise in a case-by-case approach. 
Kirchner profited from this period to solidify his rule. His leftist rhetoric 
struck a chorde with the popular masses and soon large sectors of the social 
movements were neutralised and assimilated by the assistance programs. This 
pacification of the conflict brought a new challenge to the recovered enterprises. 
The dangers of normalization are two-fold: on the one hand, the movement may 
become defenceless and vulnerable; on the other hand, it becomes easy prey for a 
“pragmatist” type of professional bureaucrat.  
With the consolidation of the presidency, the responsiveness of the 
political system to new demands may become increasingly limited, especially if 
the political right regains ground. Under such conditions, the recovered 
enterprises need to maintain - or more accurately, to re-create - a sense of 
cohesion and emphasize their original subjectivity. The immediate task that lies 
before the recovered enterprises is to nurture a culture of activism and to try to 
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raise the workers’ sensibility to issues of social concern, increasing their 
awareness of their rights and the challenges and threats ahead. Unfortunately, the 
efforts being made in this direction seem confined to FaSinPat-Zanon.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
This study focused on assessing the future prospects of the recovered 
enterprises movement, a movement that played a symbolic role following the 
Argentinian economic crisis of 2001-2002. In addition, beyond the movement’s 
ability to surmount challenges and survive in a shifting political context, this 
paper was interested in the transformation of the nature of the movement,; 
namely, its capacity to maintain its challenge to the dominant forms of production 
within the capitalist economy.   
The study was divided into four chapters. An introductory chapter laid the 
groundwork for the research and explained the significance of the question; it then 
elaborated the framework to be used. The study proceeded on the assumption that 
two sets of variables would affect a movement’s continuity: internal factors, that 
are usually treated within the framework of resource mobilization theory (RM); 
and external factors, better addressed from the perspective of political opportunity 
structures (POS). The two bodies of theories were considered complementary, 
with a chapter consecrated to each.   
Chapter One offered a comprehensive analysis of the movement; its 
history, consequences, internal dynamics and modality. This analysis made it 
clear that what started as scattered phenomena developed into a manifest and 
widespread movement with the advent of the economic crisis of 2001-2002. This 
movement shared a common identity and pattern of action; it exhibited solidarity, 
but remained loosely organized around multiple orbits and started to develop 
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organizational rivalries. The movement that blossomed in the aftermath of the 
crisis was contracted after Nestor Kirchner assumed the presidency of Argentina. 
Building on the understanding of the movement developed in Chapter 
One, Chapters Two and Three turned to the treatment of the issue from the 
perspectives of resource mobilization theory and political opportunity structures 
respectively. Those chapters allowed us to identify major elements affecting the 
continuity of the recovered factories and the scope of their social impact.   
On the internal level, the paper argued that, with the withering of the 
extraordinary conditions of 2001-2002 that favoured the surge in the movement’s 
activity, the recovered enterprises will have to invest in two fields. The movement 
has to maintain a degree of coherence and unity by strengthening its nascent 
subjectivity and nurturing its newly acquired identity as a social movement, 
bearing in mind that fragmentation would cripple the relatively small movement61. 
This subjectivity has had a positive resonance within the larger population, and 
the middle class tends to associate positively with the movement. The egalitarian 
and combative characters of the movement appear to be a much-valued moral 
capital. The workers have counted on community-based support actions thus far; 
their integration into the local fabric is another element that needs continuous 
investment. This can be a pillar in bridging an encompassing movement with 
broader aims.  A prerequisite for this work of bridging is bringing on board other 
social and political actors and hence adopting a specific structural change agenda; 
this in turn entails a degree of raised awareness allowing workers to appropriate 
this agenda. Retaining a high degree of autonomy in any form of coalition or 
cooperation with other parties is a condition sine qua non. 
                                                 
61
 We have noted the threatening tendency of assigning authoritarian roles of leadership to 
individuals, at times not even members of the movement, which gives way to conflicting methods 
of action and rivalry.   
93 
 
The debate between proponents of a horizontal approach and those in 
favour of state nationalization overshadowed the debate over the strategic 
direction to be pursued in the legal settlement. Eventually the balance tilted in 
favour of the first option, because nationalization seemed far-fetched and 
expropriation in favour of the workers proved more legally attainable. The 
problem with both approaches is that they lack a practical understanding of the 
situation. On the one hand, the nature of the state remains unfavourable to an 
interventionist measure such as nationalization. On the other hand, while 
horizontal worker management is an appealing idea, in practice it might turn 
workers into managers who will have to operate within the market logic and bear 
the pressures of a profit-oriented capitalist system, leading to self-exploitation. 
That is why the movement needs to retain its power of contestation62. Holloway’s 
book Change the World Without Taking Power has had a sizeable influence on the 
proponents of horizontalism and spontaneity. The drawback of this approach is 
that it discourages organization – dismissing it as hierarchical – but associational 
forms that encourage the development of the new subjectivity are essential. 
On the external level, the paper argued that the structures of political 
opportunity were marked in later years by a complex relationship with a president 
who adopted a left-wing populist rhetoric favourable to social movements, but in 
practice undertook very limited measures to alleviate their social burden. The N. 
Kirchner presidency was successful in normalizing the social conflicts that 
marked post-crisis Argentina and in co-opting the social movements.  The policies 
of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner may in fact pave the way 
for the resurgence of a new right.  
                                                 
62
 As the recovered factories gain ground within the market, one wonders if this is not partly 
because they are no longer seen as a threat by the corporate sector. 
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The relationship between social movements and the presidency is 
complex, because the presidency has become a refuge for most of the social 
movements, including the vast majority of recovered enterprises, but the official 
policy relies heavily on assimilating social forces through a clientelistic 
deployment of assistance and welfare programs. At the same time, the 
movement’s autonomy was not sufficiently safeguarded, with an unconditional 
support lent to the “leftist” presidency. The early leadership of Nestor Kirchner 
presented the recovered enterprises with a valuable opportunity to press for 
structural changes; the new president lacked political support even within his own 
Peronist party and had to turn to popular support to solidify his position.  Thus the 
structure of political opportunity eventually played a paradoxical role; it allowed 
greater recognition of the movement, but garnered few new advantages (to 
borrow Gamson’s lexicon). 
At the time of writing, interesting developments continue. A recent wave 
of occupations in connection with the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 took 
place; these included the Arrufat chocolate factory, the Disco de Oro empanada 
pastry manufacturer, the Indugraf printing press, the Febatex thread factory and 
the Lidercar meat packing plant. Interestingly (and happily for the workers), the 
FaSinPat factory won their legal battle in August 2009 and were accorded a final 
expropriation of the factory (Trigona 2009).  
These recent developments indicate that the movement remains lively. 
However, and despite the fervour that continues to surround the recovered 
enterprises, they no longer constitute a significant anomaly that threatens the 
established economic order in a fundamental way. The current situation is one of 
stalemate, where the movement that acquired both political and legal legitimacy 
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has become increasingly confined to the walls of the factory; preoccupied with 
solving legal, administrative and technical problems, it is no longer systematically 
pursuing an agenda of change.  
 
Prospects  
Two events might have important consequences for the movement in the 
near future. One is the ongoing global financial crisis and the second is the recent 
legislative elections (28 June 2009). 
Although Argentina is not at the center of the global crisis, the economic 
distress that accompanied it caused a significant loss of jobs. It is not surprising 
that this stimulated a renewal of occupations. While it is not yet clear how far the 
crisis will go, nor the magnitude of the current wave of occupations, the economic 
pressure will affect existing recovered factories.  
The latest elections in Argentina were a severe setback for the current and 
the ex-president, who lost an absolute majority in the legislative house. N. 
Kirchner, who led the election campaign, had to abandon the leadership of the 
Justicialist Party, while Cristina Fernandez’s hopes for a new term have 
diminished. The elections were deemed fatal for the Kirchnerist brand of “left” 
Peronism (Alvarez 2009), but they have also signalled the emergence of new 
forces. On the right of the political echelon, Mauricio Macri’s new coalition 
Union-PRO achieved an important victory in the city of Buenos Aires; on the left, 
Fernando Solanas’ Proyecto Sur surprisingly ranked second behind Union-PRO63. 
These events spelled a reconfiguration of the political scene, as it became 
evident that the Kirchners have alienated a large part of their traditional base of 
                                                 
63
 Despite a strong showing in Buenos Aires, the electoral reach of Poyecto Sur is not comparable 
to that of Macri’s alliance. However, with 2.3% of votes and 4 deputies elected, the movement 
made an important step.  
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support64. This shift has certain implications for the recovered factories. Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner, who lost a comfortable lead in parliament, will have to 
compromise and reach out to internal dissenters within the ranks of the Justicialist 
party in order to continue to govern with the support of the FPV; however, the risk 
of dissent remains a distinct possibility. A new face is likely to be put forward by 
the Justicialist party, Nestor Kirchner having already ceded his place to Daniel 
Scioli. Parliamentary opposition will become bolder because it gained greater 
leverage in its recent electoral breakthrough.  
In the face of a rising right, the recovered factories may remain passive 
and focused on their managerial mission, while the center of power shifts towards 
the right. Such an attitude would endanger the future of the movement, because a 
market-friendly administration would constrain the movement by its economic 
policies. However, if the workers act as a social movement, meaning that the 
essence of their work is political, they will articulate their interests and prepare 
their defence. Like any other productive force, the recovered factories constitute 
political entities, since their activity is affected by political and economic choices. 
But they represent a more volatile and vulnerable entity because they function 
outside the usually accepted norms of market production. The ascendance of a 
new, radical leftist formation led by Solanas, who is distinguished by his 
credibility and a declared sympathy towards the workers’ cause, opens the 
possibility for strategic alliances. At the same time, the weakened Peronist left , 
which might place a higher value on allies than previously, might be more open to 
compromise. The movement’s ability to manoeuvre efficiently will determine the 
outcome of such a game.               
                                                 
64
 In addition to the personal style of their politics, a series of mistakes have contributed to these 
setbacks, an example being the tax on soy exports (Trigona 2008).   
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Postscript  
In preparing this thesis, several domains of research presented themselves 
as opportune for further exploration. To start with, there is a lack of fieldwork and 
statistical data on the subject; accurate figures were hard to obtain and there was 
no consistent collect of comparative data over a prolonged time period. A more 
recent study in this field is required. This would be of great interest, especially 
given the interesting changes in the political and economic spheres. It would be of 
great value for observers to document tendencies in factory occupations: 
frequency, strategy and tactics of contestation, legal processing of the cases, the 
development of non-horizontal relations and any cyclical recurrences in the 
phenomena. This is a vast domain of research that was outside the scope of this 
study.    
There is much need for emphasis on the content and the program that 
could be put forward by the movement. The discourse of a movement defines its 
political alignment and best expresses what it stands for. The various tendencies 
exhibit an interesting dynamic; this is a line of development that should be 
tracked. What programs and demands should be put forward regarding past debt, 
availability of credit, training and skills refinement programs, and legislative 
guarantees? These questions are of a strategic order, but they are also related to 
the political possibilities that may or may not exist in the current political make-
up of Argentina. In other words, this aspect is related to the general political 
situation. Unfortunately this research could not address this important dimension 
in a substantial manner. 
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The movement as a transnational actor is yet another aspect that deserves 
to be treated. Similar movements are scattered across a number of Latin American 
countries, their interrelatedness needs to be explored. Interestingly, in Venezuela 
they enjoy institutionalised support and encouragement from the Chavez 
government. It would be interesting to contrast these policies and their effects to 
the case of Argentina. 
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